

Interactions between Social Security Reform and the Supplemental Security Income Program for the Aged

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Abstract

Most analyses of Social Security reforms ignore interactions with the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. We explicitly consider such interactions using a microsimulation model. The basic reform we examine reduces Social Security benefits by the percentage required to approach 75-year solvency. We then add options for attenuating the effects on low-income beneficiaries, including a minimum Social Security benefit and liberalization of three SSI program parameters. Focusing on the elderly in 2022, we compare the simulated reforms with respect to benefit receipt patterns, poverty rates, and winners and losers. Social Security beneficiaries turn to the SSI program for income support in response to Social Security benefit reductions, but substantial SSI reforms are necessary if the SSI program is to play a more effective income security role. Among the limited set of reform options we consider, Social Security minimum benefit plans would be more effective in reducing poverty among low-income beneficiaries.

Executive Summary

Due in large part to the impending retirement of the baby boom cohort, the Social Security program under current law is projected to face benefit obligations in excess of tax receipts by 2018. Program actuaries project that the trust fund balance will be depleted in 2042 (Board of Trustees 2003). Analysts and legislators have put forth numerous proposals to return the Social Security program to long-term solvency, but most of those proposals ignore the interactions between Social Security reform and the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), which is a means-tested program for elderly individuals and couples with low incomes and limited assets. Only a handful of recent papers have begun to consider the income support features of SSI as an integral part of Social Security reform (Favreault, Berk, and Smith 2003; Koenig et al. 2003; Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003).

This paper explicitly considers interactions between potential Social Security reforms and the elderly component of the SSI program. Using a microsimulation model—the Social Security Administration’s Modeling Income in the Near Term—we simulate six reform options that consist of changes to the Social Security system and/or changes to the SSI program. The common element of each reform package is a reduction in Social Security benefits by the percentage necessary to approach 75-year solvency. We then add options for:

- creating a minimum Social Security benefit;
- increasing the SSI federal benefit rate;
- increasing the SSI general income exclusion; and
- increasing the SSI asset threshold.

We compare the effects of the simulated reforms on the elderly population in 2022, specifically focusing on changes in benefit receipt patterns, poverty rates, and winners and losers from each reform option.

Our analyses show that the current SSI program will shield only a fraction of elderly individuals from Social Security benefits cuts required to bring the system into long-term fiscal balance. This reflects projected future declines in the percentage of elderly individuals who receive SSI benefits, as well as the failure of SSI eligibility parameters to keep pace with inflation. In simulations in which the SSI general income exclusion is increased to its inflation-adjusted level, the proportion of elderly individuals who receive SSI increased, the percentage of elderly individuals who received larger SSI benefits increased, and the average benefit gain increased. Corresponding effects for increasing SSI federal benefit rate were somewhat stronger. The option that increases the SSI asset threshold produced the strongest results among the SSI options considered. Although poverty rates among the elderly were not substantially reduced, the income of concurrent Social Security-SSI recipients and SSI-only recipients was markedly increased relative to the Social Security benefit cut reform. The reform options that included a Social Security minimum benefit, however, produced the strongest results across the board, even when designed in a cost-neutral fashion. Our conclusions are of course limited to the set of Social Security and SSI reform options that we simulate, and thus should be used cautiously.

This study raises the question of whether it is preferable to meet the needs of the low-income elderly through the Social Security program or through a means-tested social welfare program like SSI. The Social Security minimum benefit plans that we simulated are more

effective at reducing poverty among the elderly than the SSI reform options that we simulated, and are better targeted if the goal is to offset lost income due to Social Security benefit cuts. In addition, minimum benefits can be designed to be cost neutral to the Social Security trust fund. Nevertheless, the SSI program is critical to the income security of many low-income elderly individuals. It may be the case that some combination of Social Security minimum benefits and SSI reform would be desirable to protect lower income elderly beneficiaries from across-the-board benefit cuts. The highly stylized minimum benefits options in this paper are tied to work history, thus leaving open the possibility that those Social Security beneficiaries with the lowest incomes and the shortest work histories will fall through the cracks. For those individuals, the SSI program, whether reformed or in its current state, will remain a vital source of support.

Introduction and Background

The Social Security program under current law is not financially solvent due to the impending retirement of the baby boom cohort and other demographic and economic factors. In other words, at some point in the future, benefit obligations will exceed tax receipts and the trust fund balance will be exhausted. The latest estimates from the Social Security Board of Trustees indicate that benefits will exceed revenues in 2018, and the trust fund balance will be depleted in 2042 (Board of Trustees 2003). As this pending problem has been apparent for many years, analysts and legislators have put forth numerous proposals to return the Social Security program to long-term solvency. Most of those proposals, however, ignore the interactions between Social Security reform and the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). SSI is a means-tested program administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) that essentially provides an income floor for elderly individuals and couples with low incomes and limited assets.¹ The reforms developed by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, for example, do not consider interactions with the SSI program. Rather, the Commission's report suggests that the SSI program should be re-examined for consistency with a reformed Social Security system (President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security 2001). Indeed, only recently have researchers begun to estimate the effects of Social Security reform on the SSI program, or consider the income support features of SSI as an integral part of Social Security reform (Favreault, Berk, and Smith 2003; Koenig et al. 2003; Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003).

This paper explicitly considers interactions between potential Social Security reforms and the elderly component of the SSI program. Using a microsimulation model—the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT)—we simulate six reform options that consist of changes to the Social Security system and/or changes to the SSI program. The common element of each reform package might be thought of as a “worst-case” scenario—a reduction in Social Security benefits by the percentage necessary to approach 75-year solvency. To this benefit reduction, we then add options for creating a minimum Social Security benefit, increasing the SSI federal benefit rate, increasing the SSI general income exclusion, and increasing the SSI asset threshold. We compare the effects of the simulated reforms on the elderly population in 2022 to current law estimates for the elderly in 2022, specifically focusing on changes in benefit receipt patterns (Social Security only, SSI only, concurrent Social Security and SSI, neither), poverty status for each group of program participants, and winners and losers from each reform option. In addition, appendix tables present detailed distributional estimates for each reform package by gender, marital status, age, and lifetime earnings quintile.

Our estimates suggest that elderly Social Security beneficiaries will indeed turn to the SSI program to help replace lost income from Social Security benefit cuts, but only in relatively small fractions. However, if the Social Security benefit cuts are combined with SSI reforms, the SSI program will play a more important income security role for those elderly Social Security beneficiaries at the lower end of the income distribution. Having said that, the implementation of a minimum benefit as part of the Social Security program does more to provide income security and alleviate poverty among the elderly, and can be designed in a cost-neutral fashion. In order for the SSI program to play a more effective income security role for the elderly in the face of

¹ The SSI program also provides benefits to disabled adults and children with low incomes and assets. However, this paper only focuses on the portion of the SSI program that pays benefits to the elderly (aged 65 and over).

Social Security benefit reductions, substantial SSI reforms are needed. Although such reforms would drastically increase the cost of the SSI program, the resulting increase in combined Social Security and SSI expenditures on the elderly would be fairly modest.

Clearly, many other Social Security and SSI reform options are under consideration. For example, many proposals call for the creation of personal retirement accounts and/or price indexing of initial Social Security benefits (rather than wage indexing) (President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security 2001). One can envision several different versions of a Social Security minimum benefit. Different SSI reforms also are available, for example benefit reforms tied to living arrangements (Koenig et al. 2003). Such reforms are substantially more complex than the options simulated in this paper. They may generate behavioral responses and/or interactions between the Social Security and SSI programs that are different than those simulated here, and thus may lead to different conclusions about the distributional implications of Social Security reform. Our conclusions about the relative effects of Social Security and SSI reforms on the elderly are thus limited to the set of reform options explicitly simulated in this paper.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some background on the SSI program, its importance in reducing poverty among the elderly, and how it interacts with the Social Security program. We then describe the six reform options that are the focus of our simulations, followed by a discussion of the simulation methodology and presentation of the results of the simulations. The final section offers some concluding thoughts.

SSI Program

The SSI program provides an income floor for elderly and disabled persons. It first started paying benefits in January 1974. Individuals with low incomes and limited assets who are age 65 or over or who meet SSA's strict disability criteria can receive a basic monthly benefit from the program. In 2003, the federal benefit rate (FBR) for SSI was \$552 for individuals and \$829 for couples. That amounts to about 74 percent of the federal poverty guideline for an aged individual and 82 percent of the federal poverty guideline for an aged couple. The FBR is indexed for inflation, increasing each year based on the cost-of-living adjustment to Social Security benefits. The monthly federal SSI benefit for which an individual or couple is eligible is equal to the relevant FBR less countable income. Forty-five states supplement the federal benefit, with wide variation in supplement amounts and eligibility rules.

In December 2002, approximately 2 million elderly individuals received SSI benefits, along with 3.9 million individuals aged 18 to 64 and 0.9 million children under age 18. Although the overall SSI caseload has grown substantially—from 4 million recipients in 1974 to 6.8 million recipients in 2002—elderly recipients have decreased both in absolute number and as a proportion of the total caseload. In 2002, the elderly accounted for just 29 percent of the total SSI caseload, compared to nearly 61 percent in 1974 (Social Security Administration, 2003b, table 3).

A variety of exclusions are applied when determining countable income for federal SSI benefits. The first \$20 of income of any kind is excluded from countable income (this is known as the program's general income exclusion). For elderly individuals and couples, this often amounts to excluding the first \$20 of monthly Social Security income. After that, Social Security

benefits (and other unearned income) reduce SSI benefits on a dollar-for-dollar basis. As a work incentive, the first \$65 of monthly earnings and one-half of monthly earnings in excess of \$65 is excluded from countable income. The level of these exclusions has not changed since the inception of the SSI program in 1974, and inflation has eroded their value substantially.

The SSI resource test requires that eligible individuals have no more than \$2,000 of countable resources. The corresponding threshold for couples is \$3,000. The value of the individual's or couple's primary residence is not counted against the asset test, nor is the value of one vehicle, as long as it is used to get to work or medical appointments. Resource exclusions also are available for up to \$1,500 set aside for burial expenses, and for the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy up to \$1,500. The resource thresholds have not been increased since 1989, thus their real value has decreased substantially over time.

Despite this erosion in the value of eligibility and exclusion parameters because of inflation, SSI remains an important source of income for elderly recipients. The average monthly federally administered payment to elderly SSI recipients was \$332 in December 2002 (Social Security Administration, 2003b, table 4). Tabulations of elderly SSI recipients in December 1999, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to SSA administrative records, suggest the following: (1) SSI benefits accounted for approximately 41 percent of family income; (2) SSI benefits moved nearly 32 percent of those who would have been in poverty without SSI benefits above the poverty threshold; and (3) SSI payments reduced the poverty gap² by nearly 69 percent (Social Security Administration 2003b, tables 37, 39, and 40). Moreover, SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid in most states. Only 11 states have Medicaid eligibility criteria that are more restrictive than the SSI eligibility criteria. Nevertheless, SSI participation rates among eligible, elderly individuals are low. Most studies estimate that only 53 to 62 percent of those eligible for SSI benefits participate in the program (Davies 2002; Davies et al. 2002; McGarry 1996, 2002).

Reform Options

We consider six potential reform options, which we describe below and in table 1. The common feature of all six reform options is the Social Security (OASDI) benefit cut of option 1. Options 2 through 6 include additional features that offset the benefit cut to varying degrees for certain groups. Carrying the benefit cut of option 1 through the other five reform options supports the most consistent comparisons of the various offset features.

Option 1: Cut OASDI benefits by the percentage necessary to achieve 75-year solvency. According to the Board of Trustees (2003), an immediate benefit cut of 13 percent would return the OASDI trust fund to 75-year solvency. Although this is a rather draconian approach to solving the solvency problem, it is well suited for addressing this paper's research objectives. First, it is a straightforward reform option that we can easily model in MINT. Second, large OASDI benefit reductions provide perhaps the most direct avenue for spillover effects on the SSI program. As OASDI benefits decline, some beneficiaries will become eligible for SSI benefits,

² When a recipient's family income is below the poverty line, the difference between the poverty line and family income is equal to that recipient's poverty gap.

while those who receive SSI under current law will see a dollar-for-dollar increase in their SSI benefit, up to the FBR.

Table 1. Policy Simulations

Simulation description	Start year/cohort	Behavioral and programmatic assumptions
1 Use proportional reductions in each of the bend percentages to cut OASDI benefits by the percentage necessary to approach 75-year solvency; ^a cuts increase by one percent per year over the first ten years, so those who had less time to plan for the cuts receive smaller cuts.	First reach age 60, become disabled, or die in 2004 (others are grandfathered); spouses and survivors receive the rules of their own cohort, not their worker spouses' cohort	Benefit cut influence SSI take-up via the expected federal benefit. In a sensitivity analysis (available upon request), we allowed the cut to influence the retirement decision via a reduction in Social Security wealth (and a change in the premium value streams) and Social Security take-up via own and spouse PIAs, with minimal effect.
2 Same as 1, but add a minimum benefit equal to 50 percent of the wage-indexed poverty threshold for workers with at least 15 years of work, with 2 percent more for each additional year of work (reaching maximum of 100 percent of wage-indexed poverty for those with 40 work years).	Same as 1; minimum benefit applies to same cohorts only	Years of work defined by four covered quarters; begin wage indexing poverty level in 2004; behavior same as 1. (With more sophisticated OASDI take-up responses, the minimum benefit may dampen the behavioral effect for some subgroups.)
3 Same as 2, but finance the minimum benefit with additional worker cuts (ranging from 2.3 to 5.4 percent based on projected cohort costs).	Same as 1; minimum benefit applies to same cohorts only	Behavior same as 2 (but PIAs will now be lower for many in the case of a sophisticated response).
4 Same as 1, but increase the SSI general income exclusion to the level it would be at had it been price indexed from its inception.	Same as 1; GIE increase applies to all cohorts	Behavior same as 2, but SSI take-up will change further still via the expected federal benefit.
5 Same as 1, but increase the SSI FBR by the same amount (up to 13 percent) as the average OASDI benefit cut from 1 (phased in as above).	Same as 1; SSI increase applies only to target cohorts	Behavior same as 2, but SSI take-up will change further still via the expected federal benefit.
6 Same as 1, but increase the SSI asset threshold to \$20,000 for individual and \$30,000 for a couple, and price index thereafter.	Those eligible for SSI in 2003 and later (not restricted by cohort)	Asset threshold increase also effective 2003.

Notes:

a. This reduction estimate comes from outside the model, as MINT only simulates to 2032. The Trustees' Report (Board of Trustees 2003) suggests that an immediate 13 percent cut is sufficient. We achieve less cost savings than an immediate cut would imply, given that we grandfather current beneficiaries and have a phase in for the reform.

We apply the OASDI benefit cut to all individuals who first reach age 60, become disabled, or die in 2004. All others are grandfathered under current law. We phase the cut in gradually, with a one benefit percent reduction for those in the first cohort (1944) and an additional percentage point for each subsequent cohort, until reaching the ultimate reduction of 13 percent for all persons born in 1956 or later. Spouses and survivors face the rules of their own cohort, not of the working spouse's cohort. This reform option influences SSI take-up among the elderly via changes to the expected SSI federal benefit.³

Option 2: OASDI benefit cut plus minimum benefit financed by general revenues.

Recognizing the rather drastic nature of reform option 1, option 2 attempts to offset the OASDI benefit cuts to some degree for those at the lower end of the benefit distribution. The minimum benefit provision is tied to both the poverty threshold and an individual's work history. The basic minimum benefit is set at 50 percent of poverty for workers with at least 15 years of covered work, where a year of covered work is defined as four covered quarters. The minimum benefit increases by two percentage points for each additional year of covered work, reaching a maximum of 100 percent of poverty for those with 40 years of work. Further, the minimum is wage indexed starting in 2004 to prevent erosion of its value. Because general revenues finance this minimum benefit, it does not adversely affect the OASDI trust fund. However, general revenue is a scarce resource. Our simulations do not consider the trade-offs that Congress will face in terms of competing priorities for general revenue expenditures. The general-revenue financed minimum benefit is quite different from potential reforms to the SSI program, which would also be financed by general revenues. The Social Security minimum benefit is tied to Social Security covered work history and has no asset test. SSI, on the other hand, is based on current income, regardless of work history, and is limited to those with very low assets.

Option 3: OASDI benefit cut plus minimum benefit financed by additional OASDI benefit cuts. Option 3 includes the same OASDI benefit cut of option 1, and the same minimum benefit of option 2, but finances the minimum benefit through additional reductions to OASDI worker benefits rather than through general revenues. Specifically, we readjust the bend points in the PIA formula for each cohort, reducing them sufficiently to finance the minimum benefit (based on tabulations of the total expenditures on the minimum benefit by cohort). For example, in the 1944 cohort, we reduce each of the bend points by an additional 3.7 percent (above the scheduled one percent reduction), and for the 1954 cohort by an additional 3.5 percent (above the scheduled 11 percent reduction). By financing the minimum benefit through additional reductions to OASDI worker benefits, this option avoids the "free-rider" problem of many reform proposals in which the Social Security trust fund balance is improved at the expense of general revenues or future cohorts of workers.

³ In MINT, the reform could also influence retirement decisions via a reduction in Social Security wealth and influence Social Security take-up decisions through changes to the individual's and his/her spouse's PIA. We have elected against integrating such behavioral responses into our projections, given the modesty of their effects in sensitivity analyses that we conducted (available upon request). Like our sensitivity analyses, the literature on claiming responses to Social Security benefit cuts tends to find very modest responses, on the order of a few months for a benefit cut of seven to 20 percent (Fields and Mitchell 1984; Burtless and Moffitt 1984; Panis et al. 2002). Responses may be especially modest in the low-income population, as persons who are close to SSI eligibility tend to have limited human capital and work experience, rendering them unlikely to radically change work behavior.

Option 4: OASDI benefit cut plus increase SSI general income exclusion. Option 4 differs from the others in that it introduces a change to the SSI program rules to dampen the effect of reduced OASDI benefits on low-income elderly beneficiaries. As we have noted, the SSI general income exclusion currently allows recipients to exclude the first \$20 of monthly income from their SSI countable income, which for most elderly SSI recipients amounts to excluding \$20 of their monthly Social Security benefit. By increasing the general income exclusion—in this case, to its level had it been price indexed since 1974—low-income OASDI beneficiaries would be able to exclude a larger amount of their Social Security benefit, thus increasing their monthly SSI benefit. Because the Social Security minimum benefit in Options 2 and 3 is tied to work history, some low-income Social Security beneficiaries may not qualify for the minimum benefit. For those individuals, an expanded SSI program may be the only source of income support in the face of the Social Security benefit cuts. In addition, this reform would benefit those SSI recipients who are not Social Security beneficiaries to the extent that they have income in excess of the current \$20 general income exclusion. It also may induce entry into the SSI program. The higher general income exclusion would expand the pool of SSI eligible individuals, and may be enough to entice some eligible nonparticipants to take up SSI benefits.

Option 5: OASDI benefit cut plus increase SSI federal benefit rate. The increase in the SSI general income exclusion is targeted in the sense that it benefits primarily those elderly SSI recipients with Social Security income. Option 5 includes a more general reform to the SSI program—increasing the federal benefit rate by 13 percent, to be phased in in the same manner as the OASDI benefit cut of option 1. This across-the-board increase will benefit all elderly SSI recipients in the affected cohorts, whether or not they face reduced OASDI benefits, as well as expand the eligibility pool and induce entry into the SSI program. Thus, we expect its effects to be greater than the effects of option 4, but somewhat less target efficient to the extent that SSI-only recipients will also see an increase in their monthly income. Nevertheless, even with a 13 percent increase in the federal benefit rate, the SSI income guarantee still falls below poverty (about 83 percent of the federal poverty guideline for an individual and 93 percent for a couple).

Option 6: OASDI benefit cut plus increase SSI asset thresholds. Previous research has shown that the SSI asset test is particularly restrictive in terms of screening out potential elderly SSI recipients. Many elderly individuals have incomes low enough to pass the SSI income test, but are ineligible because their countable assets exceed the asset threshold. SSI reforms that increase the asset threshold are more beneficial to the lowest-income elderly individuals than are cost-equivalent increases in the federal benefit rate or the general income exclusion (Rupp, Strand, and Davies, 2003; Davies, Rupp, and Strand, forthcoming). Option 6 simulates an increase in the asset threshold to \$20,000 for individuals and \$30,000 for couples in 2003 (and price indexes the thresholds thereafter), in conjunction with the 13 percent reduction in OASDI benefits. For elderly individuals who currently receive SSI benefits, this option would have no effect on SSI benefits and will not offset the OASDI benefit reduction. For SSI income-eligible individuals who have resources in excess of the current SSI asset threshold, this option can have potentially very strong effects in terms of offsetting the OASDI benefit cuts. For example, based on income alone, an individual may be eligible for the full federal benefit (\$552 in 2003), but may receive nothing if her countable assets are greater than \$2,000. When the asset threshold is increased, that same individual faces a \$552 monthly incentive to take up SSI benefits. Options 4

and 5, on the other hand, provide only marginal increases in potential SSI benefits for new eligibles and eligible nonparticipants.

Methods

To examine interactions between Social Security reform and SSI, we use the SSA's Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT3). MINT is a microsimulation model. Its starting database, comprised of the 1926 to 1965 birth cohorts, is drawn from the 1990 to 1993 panels of the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The model uses annual aging algorithms estimated from panel data, and provides extensive detail on retirement income sources, including earnings, wealth, pensions, Social Security, and SSI benefits. Appendix table 1 provides general details about MINT. Specific details about individual modules are available in appendix table 2. Microsimulation is an ideal method for examining the distributional effects of public pension and social assistance reform (Burtless 1996).

The SSA has been developing MINT to project the economic needs of the baby boom cohorts in retirement, beginning with the work of Iams and Sandell (1997). Subsequently, researchers from the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation, and the Urban Institute made substantial contributions to the model's development (see, for example, Toder et al. 1999, 2002, Panis and Lillard 1999). Researchers have used this model to examine a number of important questions, including projections of future poverty levels (Butrica, Smith, and Toder 2002), effects of divorce on retirement well-being (Butrica and Iams 2000), and effects of removal of the retirement earnings test before the normal retirement age (Berk, Favreault, and Ratcliffe 2003). Work to model the plans of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security is underway as well (Butrica and Uccello forthcoming).

For the current project, one key advantage of MINT over other microanalytic models is its match to administrative records on earnings and Social Security Administration program benefit receipt. In surveys, individuals often misreport their earnings (for example, rounding to the nearest multiple of \$1,000 or \$5,000). They also frequently misreport their reasons for receipt of benefits from SSA programs (for example, they confuse the Supplemental Security Income program with the Social Security program) (Huynh, Rupp, and Sears 2002).

Recent analyses for the development of a new release of MINT, MINT4, suggest that the MINT3 results are sensitive to economic conditions in the last year for which the model uses administrative data. Because MINT3's last year of administrative data is 1999, a boom year for the U.S. economy, the projections are fairly optimistic. They show substantial declines in aged poverty by 2022, though some groups remain quite vulnerable. Because of this sensitivity to economic cycles, we suggest that readers interpret our projection results conservatively, bearing in mind the considerable uncertainty that always surrounds long-term projections of this type.

SSI Participation

For the estimates presented in this paper, we have developed a model of SSI participation among the elderly, which uses the SSI Financial Eligibility Model as its base. These new SSI participation parameters replace the original MINT3 SSI participation parameters and are used

within the existing MINT module to project SSI participation and benefits into the future.⁴ Toder et al. (2002) describe the MINT model's SSI module in detail.

The SSI Financial Eligibility Model (FEM) is a microsimulation model that the Social Security Administration's Office of Policy developed to estimate SSI financial eligibility and participation, and to simulate the effects of potential SSI policy changes. For example, SSA analysts have used the FEM to simulate the effects of cost-equivalent increases of the federal benefit rate, the general income exclusion, and the asset threshold on the poverty gap among the elderly (Davies, Rupp, and Strand forthcoming). The FEM also has been used to simulate the effect on poverty among elderly women of cost-equivalent Social Security-related SSI reforms, including creating a Social Security income exclusion, and replacing the SSI asset test with an income debit based on the annuitized value of countable assets (Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003). The FEM uses data from the SIPP, matched to SSA administrative data on SSI recipients, to estimate SSI eligibility and the expected federal SSI benefit. Currently, the FEM is capable of producing estimates for 1991 (using the 1990 SIPP) and 1997 (using the 1996 SIPP). A detailed discussion of the data and methodology used in the FEM is provided in Davies et al. (2002).

We combine the 1991 and 1997 data and estimate a model of SSI participation among SSI eligible individuals aged 65 and over. Based on the FEM, the individuals in our sample are categorically eligible for SSI (aged 65 or older), pass the SSI resource test (countable assets less than \$2,000 for individuals and \$3,000 for couples), and pass the SSI income test (countable income less than the federal benefit rate for individuals/couples of \$407/\$610 in 1991 and \$484/\$726 in 1997). The estimation sample includes 548 individuals in 1991 and 842 individuals in 1997, for a combined sample of 1,390 individuals. We present descriptive characteristics of these individuals in appendix table 3.

We estimated the probability of SSI participation using the standard probit model. Participation is a function of a vector of exogenous variables that are projected for each future year in the MINT model, including the expected federal SSI benefit (in 1997 dollars), potential SSI state supplements, the number of months of SSI receipt since age 62, an indicator of shared living arrangements, and standard demographic characteristics. We present the probit coefficients and marginal effects in appendix table 4.

Perhaps the most important independent variable is the expected federal SSI benefit. Numerous studies in the long line of literature on SSI participation among the elderly have found a positive and statistically significant relationship between expected benefits and SSI participation. For example, Coe (1985) found that a \$10 increase in the expected SSI benefit would increase the probability of participation among eligible individuals aged 65 and older by 2.4 percentage points. McGarry (1996) estimated a very comparable effect of 2.6 percentage points for the same population. Focusing on eligible individuals aged 70 and older, Davies (2002) and McGarry (2002) estimated that a \$10 increase in the predicted SSI benefit would increase the probability of SSI participation by 1.5 percentage points and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. Our estimates using combined 1991 and 1997 SIPP data on elderly SSI eligibles suggest that the expected SSI benefit is positively and significantly related to SSI participation.

⁴ We make the additional change to MINT3 of updating Trustees' Report assumptions to their 2003 values in the calculation of Social Security benefits and final incomes.

A \$10 increase in the federal SSI benefit would increase the probability of participation by 0.3 percentage points among eligible individuals aged 65 and older. This estimate compares favorably with previous estimates using 1991 data from the SSI FEM (Davies et al. 2002; Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003).

Another key variable in our model is the number of months of SSI receipt since age 62. Prior association with the SSI program is positively related to current SSI participation, with an additional month of prior participation increasing the probability of current period participation by approximately one percentage point.⁵

Age is negatively and significantly related to the probability of SSI participation among elderly eligible individuals. Females are significantly less likely to participate than males, all else equal. Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, and Hispanics are less likely to participate than non-Hispanic whites, although the coefficients are not statistically significant. Elderly SSI eligible individuals who are widowed or never married are significantly more likely than those who are married to participate in the SSI program. Being divorced or separated also is positively related to SSI participation, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. Elderly SSI eligible individuals who own their home are significantly less likely to participate than those who do not own their home (i.e., rent or live in another person's home). Shared living arrangements (defined as living with at least one relative other than a spouse who is aged 30 or older) are positively and significantly related to SSI participation. Elderly SSI eligible individuals with shared living arrangements are 8.3 percentage points more likely to participate in the SSI program than those who live independently.

Receipt of Social Security income by the individual or his/her spouse increases the probability of SSI participation 11.1 percentage points relative to those without Social Security income. The estimated coefficient on self-reported fair or poor health is positive, but not statistically significant. Foreign-born individuals are more likely to participate in the program, but again the effect is not statistically significant. However, the number of years since migration to the U.S. is a significant determinant of SSI participation. The probability of SSI participation among eligible elderly individuals increases with years since migration at a decreasing rate. This may reflect recent reforms to SSI that require U.S. citizenship or 40 quarters of Social Security-covered employment for most immigrants who entered the U.S. after August 1996.

Results

Current law estimates for 2022—Social Security and SSI

Under current law, MINT projects important changes to Social Security benefits through 2022. For example, women increasingly receive OASDI benefits in their own right, rather than as

⁵ We regard the SSI history variable to be important in forecasting future SSI participation among eligible elderly individuals with a history of SSI participation. However, this variable may be somewhat problematic when simulating SSI take-up under our reform options. As a sensitivity test, we re-estimated the SSI participation model without the SSI history variable, and then re-ran the current law simulation and the simulations for the six reform options. The results are presented and discussed in detail in the Appendix. We are grateful to Kalman Rupp for alerting us to this potential problem.

spouses or survivors. At ages 65 to 78, nearly 58 percent of female beneficiaries are entitled to Social Security solely as workers, and close to 95 percent are entitled as workers or dual entitlees (table 2).⁶ They still receive average family benefits that are lower than men’s, though, \$19,134 annually (in 2002 dollars) for women ages 65 to 78, compared to \$21,136 for men in this same age range. (These averages are for the entire population, and thus are not conditional upon OASDI benefit receipt. When we restrict the calculation to beneficiaries, these averages increase to \$23,326 for men and \$20,456 for women.)

Table 2. Average Annual Social Security and SSI Benefits and Receipt Rates for Persons Ages 65 to 78 in 2022 Under Current Law

	Social Security Benefit			SSI Benefit				
	Average (2002\$)	Percent nonzero	Percent of Beneficiaries Entitled as Workers	Average (2002\$)	Percent nonzero			
	<i>All</i>	<i>Recipients</i>		<i>Worker Only</i>	<i>Dual Entitlees</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Recipients</i>	
Men	\$21,136	\$22,326	94.7	93.2	98.8	\$110	\$4,859	2.27
Women	\$19,134	\$20,456	93.5	57.9	94.5	\$166	\$5,143	3.22
All	\$20,031	\$21,298	94.1	75.6	96.7	\$141	\$5,011	2.81

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range).

MINT projects marked declines over the next two decades in the percentage of elderly individuals who receive SSI. While at present about 5.2 percent of the population age 65 and older receives an SSI check (Social Security Administration 2003a), by 2022 less than 4 percent of the population age 65 and older should be receiving SSI benefits.⁷ Among the population affected by our simulations (those ages 65 to 78), just under 3 percent receive SSI benefits. This projected downward trend is not surprising, given that SSI benefits are indexed to prices, while initial Social Security benefits are indexed to wages and many of SSI’s eligibility and exclusion parameters are not indexed. This implies that Social Security benefits should grow faster than SSI benefits and, because of one-for-one replacement of SSI benefits by unearned income (including Social Security), should increasingly supplant them. Further, increased work by women and broader Social Security coverage of the labor force mean that fewer people will reach retirement without a work history or with significant fractions of their work history in employment that Social Security did not cover.

General Results of Reform Options in 2022

Tables 3 through 7 provide a summary of key results from the simulations of the reform options, including estimates of total costs, poverty impacts, and gains and losses, in turn. For these tables, we restrict the population to persons that the reforms could potentially affect, those ages 65 to 78 in 2022. We report all benefit amounts in constant 2002 dollars.

⁶ In 2001, comparable figures for women ages 65 to 79 were 40 percent pure worker only cases and 67 percent with any worker component (including dual entitlees) (Social Security Administration 2002: Table 5.A15).

⁷ Because MINT contains only cohorts from 1926 onward, the 2022 estimates include only persons up through age 96.

Readers seeking additional detail can consult additional tables in the appendix. More detailed poverty estimates are in appendix table 5. More detailed results for winners, losers, and aggregate benefit distributions from each of the six simulations are available in appendix tables 6 through 11. These tables include comparisons of OASDI, SSI, and combined benefits by sex, marital status, age, shared lifetime earnings quintile,⁸ health status, and various combinations of these attributes.

Costs

Five of the six options that we simulate are relatively close in terms of how they change combined SSI and Social Security expenditures. Table 3 presents SSI and OASDI program costs (in 2002 dollars) in 2022, our analysis year. It reveals that the benefit cut alone, the benefit cut with the expenditure-neutral minimum benefit, the increase in the SSI general income exclusion, the 13 percent SSI increase, and the increase in the SSI asset threshold all reduce combined OASDI/SSI expenditures to between 92.6 percent and 92.7 percent of promised current law levels in 2022. The reform with the general revenue-financed minimum has the smallest effect on the deficit of the six; under it, projected 2022 expenditures are 94.9 percent of what current law promises.

These combined figures mask important variation in expenditure changes for the two programs across the different options. A first important point is that when we impose the 13 percent cut in Social Security benefits, the overall cost reduction is far less than 13 percent. This is because we phase in the cuts gradually (as table 1 notes, by one percentage point per year per cohort, starting with the 1944 cohort). By 2022, the cut in Social Security benefits relative to current law promised benefits totals about 7.3 percent. In the three simulations with SSI changes, we assume the Social Security benefit cut to be identical. With the cut-financed minimum benefit, the Social Security cost reduction in 2022 is slightly more than for the 13 percent cut alone, coming in at about 7.4 percent of current law expenditures.⁹ With the general revenue-financed minimum benefit in OASDI, however, the Social Security cost reduction is substantially smaller in 2022, only about 5.1 percent less than current law.

A modest increase in SSI expenditures, of about 5.4 percent of current law levels, accompanies the 13 percent OASDI cut when there are no additional changes to Social Security or SSI. Even after the 13 percent OASDI benefit cut, the SSI increase does not approach the scope of the OASDI cut because such a small fraction of the aged population is eligible for SSI and the SSI take-up rates are low.

The options with the OASDI and SSI parameter changes designed to offset the OASDI benefit cut for low-income beneficiaries have varying impacts on SSI expenditures. For example, under the reform that couples the 13 percent OASDI benefit cut with a liberalized SSI asset

⁸ We define the shared lifetime earnings quintile from ages 25 to 62, averaging indexed earnings at each age. These indexed earnings are the average of husband and wife earnings for all years when one is married, and one's own earnings for years in which one is single.

⁹ This slight difference arises because the costs for the minimum benefit were targeted to balance over a longer term, through 2050, not just through 2022.

threshold, SSI expenditures increase by 54 percent over current law levels in 2022. The 13 percent SSI benefit increase leads to the next largest increase in SSI expenditures (of about 16.5 percent), followed by the increase in the general income exclusion (at about 16 percent). Under the former reform, an increase of larger than 13 percent is possible because increased benefits lead to greater eligibility and take-up than is present at baseline. The two minimum benefit plans, in contrast, actually reduce SSI expenditures. As the more generous OASDI benefits become available to concurrent OASDI-SSI beneficiaries, SSI expenditures fall by 1.7 percent under the general-revenue financed version and 1.0 percent under the less generous cut-financed plan, relative to current law expenditures.

Program Interaction

The aggregate cost figures mask how the two programs overlap for individual beneficiaries. Table 4 provides a clearer picture of program interactions for the older population in 2022.¹⁰ Under current law, 92.7 percent of individuals ages 65 to 78 in 2022 receive Social Security but do not receive SSI. Four and one-half percent of persons in this age range do not receive benefits from either program.¹¹ The final two groups—those who receive both SSI and Social Security and those who receive SSI but not Social Security—are very similar in size under current law, at just under one and one-half percent each.¹²

Under the six reforms, the changes from the baseline status are relatively modest. The percentage with concurrent SSI-OASDI benefits increases with the benefit cut alone and the benefit cut coupled with SSI reforms (the GIE increase, 13 percent federal benefit increase, and asset threshold increase), but declines with the introduction of the two minimum benefits. Consistent with the cost estimates, the fractions moving onto the SSI program are most substantial in the final reform, in which we increase and then index the SSI asset threshold. The percentage receiving both Social Security and SSI nearly doubles to 2.6 percent of persons aged

¹⁰ In this table we define program interactions on a couple basis for married persons (i.e., if one spouse receives Social Security benefits, then we classify both as beneficiaries).

¹¹ This population consists of three types of people: (1) the relatively rare persons who do not collect their Social Security benefits until significantly later than first eligibility for benefits (and, in some cases, even until after the normal retirement age, which ranges from 66 to 66 and 6 months for members of these cohorts); (2) those who do not qualify for benefits from either program (for example, a person with limited covered work history but high assets or a large government pension that disqualifies him or her from SSI); and (3) those who qualify for SSI benefits but choose not to take them up.

¹² The close balance between SSI beneficiaries with and without OASDI represents somewhat of a shift from current experience, where a majority (58.4 percent) of SSI beneficiaries have Social Security income (Social Security Administration 2002, 289).

Table 3. Social Security and SSI Costs for Persons Ages 65 to 78 in 2022 Under Current Law and the Alternatives

	Current Law (Promised)	OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%	Column 1 with GR-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with Cut-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase	Column 1 with 13% SSI FBR Increase	Column 1 with SSI Asset Threshold Increase
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Entire Population, Ages 65-78 in 2022</i>							
Total OASDI Costs (2002\$ in millions)	\$6,320,942	\$5,858,902	\$5,998,800	\$5,855,310	\$5,858,902	\$5,858,902	\$5,858,902
Total SSI Costs (2002\$ in millions)	\$5,942	\$6,265	\$5,839	\$5,880	\$6,899	\$6,922	\$9,150
Combined OASDI/SSI (2002\$ in millions)	\$6,326,884	\$5,865,167	\$6,004,638	\$5,861,190	\$5,865,801	\$5,865,824	\$5,868,052
Combined OASDI and SSI as % Current Law	100.0%	92.7%	94.9%	92.6%	92.7%	92.7%	92.7%
Increase in SSI as % Current Law SSI		5.4%	-1.7%	-1.0%	16.1%	16.5%	54.0%
Decrease in Soc Sec as % Current Law OASDI		-7.3%	-5.1%	-7.4%	-7.3%	-7.3%	-7.3%

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Table 4. Social Security and SSI Overlap for Persons Ages 65 to 78 in 2022 Under Current Law and the Alternatives

Joint OASDI-SSI Status	Current Law (Promised)	OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%	Column 1 with GR-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with Cut-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase	Column 1 with 13% SSI Increase	Column 1 with SSI Asset Threshold Increase
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Neither	4.53	4.55	4.51	4.54	4.53	4.54	3.82
Social Security, no SSI	92.66	92.23	92.77	92.71	91.92	91.98	91.46
Both Social Security and SSI	1.39	1.81	1.30	1.33	2.12	2.05	2.57
SSI, no Social Security	1.42	1.42	1.42	1.42	1.43	1.43	2.15

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table entries reflect percent of population in each group. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.

65 to 78, and the percentage receiving SSI only increases to 2.2 percent. For the GIE increase and 13 percent SSI increase, concurrent beneficiaries receive virtually all of the increase (from the Social Security and no SSI group, which declines).

Poverty and near poverty

To consider how the six reforms impact absolute economic well-being of older Americans in 2022, we use three separate measures of poverty (table 5). The first is whether one's Social Security benefit alone exceeds the federal poverty threshold. A second measure compares total family income to 125 percent of poverty.¹³ We refer to persons with family incomes that fall below that level as "in or near poverty." The final measure is the traditional measure of whether total family income is less than the poverty threshold.

By design, the general-revenue financed minimum benefit reduces poverty relative to the current law baseline, while costing significantly less than current law promised benefits. For example, the current law poverty rate of 4.0 percent for persons ages 65 to 78 increases to 4.8 percent with the OASDI benefit cut, but is reduced to 3.9 percent with the cut and the general revenue financed minimum benefit. With the cut-financed minimum, poverty stays at its pre-benefit cut level of 4.0 percent. This suggests that a reduced Social Security program could do as well (if not better) at poverty alleviation than current law. But, as we will describe below, this poverty reduction comes at a cost of reduced benefits among those workers and their spouses/survivors who are entitled to higher Social Security benefits before the reform.

Across beneficiary groups, the 2022 poverty estimates vary greatly. Individuals ages 65 to 78 who are collecting Social Security and not SSI have very low poverty rates, 1.6 percent under current law and 2.5 percent under the OASDI benefit reduction. All other groups show much more substantial levels of risk. Just over a quarter (27.6 percent) of the non-beneficiaries (those collecting neither SSI nor OASDI) are projected to be in poverty, with or without the OASDI benefit cut. By definition, SSI recipients are poor or near poor. Concurrent recipients (those collecting both OASDI and SSI benefits) have a poverty rate that approaches half (48.3 percent) under both current law and with the 13 percent Social Security cut. Those with just SSI are the most vulnerable of all. More than half (51.8 percent) are in poverty (again, independent of the Social Security cut).

High poverty rates for aged SSI beneficiaries persist across the reforms that aim to mitigate the effects of the benefit cuts. The 13 percent SSI benefit increase and the general income exclusion increase do the most to reduce poverty rates among elderly concurrent OASDI-SSI beneficiaries, decreasing them by about 4.5 percentage points to 43.7 percent and 43.6 percent, respectively, from 48.3 percent with the benefit cut alone. Although table 6 indicates that poverty rates are unchanged for concurrent beneficiaries under the option that increases the SSI asset threshold, this is largely an artifact of the changing composition of

¹³ We define total family income as the sum of income from earnings, assets, pensions (including defined benefit pensions, defined contribution pensions, IRAs and Keogh accounts), Social Security, and SSI for individuals and, where applicable, their spouses and coresident family members.

Table 5. Percent of Persons Ages 65 to 78 at Risk of Poverty and Near Poverty in 2022, by Program Participation, Under Different Options for Reducing Social Security Benefits

	Current Law (Promised)	OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%	Column 1 with GR-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with Cut-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase	Column 1 with 13% SSI Increase	Column 1 with SSI Asset Threshold Increase
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Poverty Measure 1:</i>							
<i>OASDI < 100% Poverty</i>							
All	13.9	17.1	14.1	14.6	17.1	17.1	17.1
Joint SSI-OASDI Type							
Neither	100.0	100.0	99.4	99.6	100.0	100.0	100.0
OASDI, no SSI	7.6	11.1	8.0	8.5	11.1	11.1	11.1
Both OASDI and SSI	93.4	94.8	86.6	86.6	94.8	94.8	94.8
SSI, no OASDI	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Poverty Measure 2:</i>							
<i>Total Income < 125% Poverty</i>							
All	6.2	7.4	6.5	6.7	7.4	7.4	7.3
Joint SSI-OASDI Type							
Neither	28.5	28.5	28.5	28.5	28.5	28.5	26.6
OASDI, no SSI	3.7	5.0	4.1	4.3	5.0	5.0	4.9
Both OASDI and SSI	57.9	57.9	56.7	56.7	57.3	57.3	58.1
SSI, no OASDI	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	54.9	55.0
<i>Poverty Measure 3:</i>							
<i>Total Income < 100% Poverty</i>							
All	4.0	4.8	3.9	4.0	4.7	4.6	4.6
Joint SSI-OASDI Type							
Neither	27.6	27.6	27.6	27.6	27.6	27.5	24.5
OASDI, no SSI	1.6	2.5	1.5	1.6	2.4	2.4	2.4
Both OASDI and SSI	48.3	48.3	46.0	46.0	43.6	43.7	48.3
SSI, no OASDI	51.8	51.8	51.8	51.8	51.8	41.7	51.7

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Total family income is the sum of income from earnings, assets, pensions (including defined benefit pensions, defined contribution pensions, IRAs and Keogh accounts), Social Security, and SSI for individuals and, where applicable, their spouses and coresident family members.

Table 6. Social Security and SSI Gains and Losses at Ages 65 to 78 in 2022 Under Current Law and the Alternatives

	Current Law (Promised)	OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%	Column 1 with GR-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with Cut-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase	Column 1 with 13% SSI Increase	Column 1 with SSI Asset Threshold Increase
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Security							
<i>All Persons</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$20,031	\$18,362	\$18,896	\$18,365	\$18,362	\$18,362	\$18,362
Percent Losing	-	92.8	78.2	79.8	92.8	92.8	92.8
Average Loss (2002\$)	-	-\$1,798	-\$1,739	-\$2,339	-\$1,798	-\$1,798	-\$1,798
<i>Social Security Beneficiaries</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$21,041	\$19,289	\$19,855	\$19,300	\$19,289	\$19,289	\$19,289
Percent Losing	-	98.0	82.2	84.0	98.0	98.0	98.0
Average Loss (2002\$)	-	-\$1,783	-\$1,716	-\$2,308	-\$1,783	-\$1,783	-\$1,783
Supplemental Security Income							
<i>All Persons</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$141	\$149	\$136	\$138	\$165	\$169	\$237
Percent Gaining	-	1.6	0.7	0.8	2.3	3.5	3.1
Average Gain (2002\$)	-	\$536	\$438	\$572	\$1,051	\$801	\$3,132
<i>Social Security Beneficiaries</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$63	\$76	\$55	\$57	\$98	\$93	\$99
Percent Gaining	-	2.4	1.1	1.2	3.2	3.1	3.2
Average Gain (2002\$)	-	\$646	\$543	\$689	\$964	\$936	\$2,042
<i>Population with Near Poverty Income</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$1,213	\$1,291	\$1,183	\$1,194	\$1,440	\$1,391	\$2,004
Percent Gaining	-	15.5	7.6	7.8	21.9	29.8	28.8
Average Gain (2002\$)	-	\$497	\$401	\$525	\$1,037	\$629	\$2,746
<i>SSI Beneficiaries</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$5,843	\$5,971	\$5,719	\$5,738	\$6,228	\$6,502	\$5,979
Percent Gaining	-	25.9	12.7	12.8	37.0	100.0	26.2
Average Gain (2002\$)	-	\$156	\$128	\$167	\$780	\$658	\$3,438
Combined Social Security/SSI							
<i>All Persons</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$20,172	\$18,512	\$19,033	\$18,503	\$18,527	\$18,531	\$18,600
Percent Losing	-	91.7	77.6	79.3	91.3	91.4	91.3
Average Loss (2002\$)	-	-\$1,811	-\$1,746	-\$2,349	-\$1,815	-\$1,814	-\$1,815
<i>Social Security Beneficiaries</i>							
Average Benefit (2002\$)	\$21,104	\$19,366	\$19,909	\$19,356	\$19,387	\$19,383	\$19,389
Percent Losing	-	96.1	81.3	83.1	95.6	95.7	95.6
Average Loss (2002\$)	-	-\$1,776	-\$1,713	-\$2,304	-\$1,424	-\$1,416	-\$1,784

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.

For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range).

Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

concurrent OASDI-SSI recipients under the reform. Many current law non-recipients with very high poverty rates become SSI recipients when the SSI asset threshold is expanded and thus depress the poverty rate of SSI recipients under the reform. The non-beneficiary poverty levels decline to 24.5 percent (from 27.6 percent under current law) with the liberalization of the SSI asset threshold. Moreover, the poverty rate for all individuals aged 65 to 78 in 2022 decreases from 4.8 percent with the OASDI benefit cut to 4.6 percent with the OASDI benefit cut combined with increasing the SSI asset threshold. These modest overall results are not all that surprising, given that SSI does not guarantee a poverty level income and given that the Social Security minimum benefit only grants a poverty level benefit to persons with very long work histories (most of whom already had benefits above poverty).

Gains and losses from reform

Table 6 shows patterns of gains and losses for people ages 65 to 78 in 2022, comparing benefits promised under current law to the alternatives. It first presents statistics for all persons, and then isolates Social Security and SSI beneficiaries in particular. The table presents conditional means for the amount of gains and losses; that is, the means are calculated only for those who gain or lose, respectively. Under the simple benefit cut option and all of the options that cut benefits in tandem with SSI increases, almost 93 percent of all persons and 98 percent of Social Security beneficiaries lose Social Security benefits.¹⁴ Under the minimum benefit reforms, fewer Social Security beneficiaries lose benefits, but still over four out of five have lower benefits in each case (82.2 and 84.0 percent for the general revenue and cut-financed minimums, respectively). The sizes of the average OASDI benefit losses are fairly similar across reforms, again with the exception of the two minimum benefit plans. While the general revenue-financed minimum benefit plan reduces losses for OASDI beneficiaries (from an average of \$1,780 to \$1,720), the cut-financed minimum benefit plan increases them (to \$2,310). This occurs because the population of beneficiaries who lose (over whom the statistic is defined) has become more select. Those low-income persons who qualify for the minimum are no longer included in the statistic, and they had reduced the average loss somewhat.

As suggested in the earlier tables, SSI gainers are just a small fraction of the persons who experience a Social Security benefit cut. Only 2.4 percent of OASDI beneficiaries receive an offset from SSI when Social Security benefits are cut by 13 percent.¹⁵ When we isolate the near poverty population, 15.5 percent of the population receives increased SSI benefits under the option that cuts benefits alone. This extends to well over one-fifth (21.9 percent) for the simulation with the general income exclusion increase, nearly three in ten (29.8 percent) for the 13 percent SSI benefit increase, and 28.8 percent with the increase in (and indexing of) the SSI asset threshold. Looking at the even more select group of SSI beneficiaries, fully 26 percent

¹⁴ The 2.0 percent of beneficiaries who do not lose benefits are mainly persons receiving a benefit on the record of a deceased spouse who is older, and thus had grandfathered benefits under the reform.

¹⁵ As noted, MINT projections are fairly optimistic because the last data year was one of strong economic performance. Even if our SSI projections are somewhat rosy, the point that SSI will make only a modest difference to Social Security beneficiaries in the wake of large cuts to the Social Security program is still supported. For example, even if SSI were to double in scope from this MINT projection, it would still reach less than 5 percent of Social Security beneficiaries under the 13 percent benefit cut option and offset cost savings by less than 0.3 percent of combined OASDI/SSI costs in 2022. So even if the quantitative estimates from MINT understate the effect, the qualitative finding that OASDI reform does not shift a large fraction of costs to the SSI program is likely to stand.

benefit from an SSI offset to the decrease in Social Security benefits. Well over a third (37 percent) benefit from the indexation of the general income exclusion, and of course all benefit from the 13 percent benefits increase.

The amounts of average SSI benefit gains vary substantially across the reforms. Average annual gains are by far the largest with the increase in (and indexing of) the SSI asset threshold, amounting to \$3,132 for all persons with a gain, \$2,042 for Social Security beneficiaries with a gain, \$2,746 for persons with income in or near poverty who gain, and \$3,438 for SSI recipients with a gain. As discussed previously, although the poverty rate was not substantially changed under this reform, the income of affected individuals increased substantially. SSI increases also are fairly substantial for persons under the general income exclusion increase, averaging \$1,050 for all who gain, \$960 for Social Security beneficiaries who gain, \$1,040 for gainers with total family income less than the poverty threshold, and \$780 for SSI beneficiaries (some of whom are new entrants to the program). A much smaller percentage of OASDI beneficiaries see a much smaller SSI increase for the minimum benefit options, averaging \$540 annually for the general-revenue financed minimum and \$690 for the cut-financed minimum.¹⁶

Although the combined OASDI and SSI benefit losses are greater than the OASDI benefit losses alone, the percentage losing (which is the base of the statistic) is much smaller for the former. For example, under the asset threshold reform, the combined benefit loss is \$1,784 for Social Security beneficiaries, but the Social Security only loss is \$1,783. However, only 95.6 percent are combined OASDI/SSI benefit losers, compared to 98.0 percent Social Security only losers. This implies that the SSI reform has a substantial effect in terms of mitigating Social Security benefit reductions. Having said that, the fact remains that fractions losing are much smaller under the two minimum benefit options.

Equity

In addition to the adequacy concerns, equity issues arise under these reforms. Table 7 presents combined Social Security and SSI benefit losses across the six reforms by the number of years that a person has spent in Social Security covered employment. Perhaps most notable in the table is the reduction in the fraction of persons with a high number of work years who lose when benefit cuts are combined with the two mitigating minimum benefit proposals. With the 13 percent benefit cut alone, virtually all people with 20 to 29, 30 to 34, or 35 and more years in the labor force lose benefits (97.1, 98.6, and 98.1 percent, respectively). These figures drop under the general-revenue financed minimum by as much as 20 percentage points for those with work histories of 20 to 29 years and 30 to 34 years (to 76.6 and 77.7 percent, respectively). Those with 35 work years or more see a decline of more than ten percentage points (to 87.5 percent). Patterns are similar, though with slightly higher fractions of losers, under the cut-

¹⁶ The SSI gains are somewhat deceptive under the minimum benefit options. Recall from Table 3 that SSI costs decreased under these options, meaning that some SSI recipients under current law actually lose SSI benefits or receive decreased benefits due to the Social Security minimum benefit.

Table 7. Combined Social Security and SSI Gains and Losses by Work History in 2022 Under the Alternatives

	OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%		Column 1 with GR- Financed Minimum		Column 1 with Cut- Financed Minimum		Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase		Column 1 with 13% SSI Increase		Column 1 with SSI Asset Threshold Increase	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Percent losing	Average loss (2002\$)	Percent losing	Average loss (2002\$)	Percent losing	Average loss (2002\$)	Percent losing	Average loss (2002\$)	Percent losing	Average loss (2002\$)	Percent losing	Average loss (2002\$)
Combined Social Security and SSI												
By Years Worked												
Zero work years	12.6	-\$1,092	11.3	-\$1,002	11.4	-\$1,461	12.3	-\$1,100	12.3	-\$1,106	11.7	-\$1,139
1-19	78.0	-\$1,438	67.3	-\$1,451	68.0	-\$1,964	76.9	-\$1,448	77.1	-\$1,446	76.7	-\$1,446
20-29	97.1	-\$1,599	76.6	-\$1,525	78.6	-\$2,035	96.5	-\$1,601	96.7	-\$1,601	96.6	-\$1,602
30-34	98.6	-\$1,808	77.7	-\$1,707	80.1	-\$2,272	98.5	-\$1,809	98.5	-\$1,809	98.5	-\$1,809
35+	98.1	-\$2,045	87.5	-\$1,957	89.2	-\$2,641	98.1	-\$2,046	98.1	-\$2,045	98.1	-\$2,045

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.

For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range).

Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

financed minimum. The SSI reforms, in contrast, do little to change patterns of gains and losses by work history.

Conclusions

The current SSI program will shield only a fraction of elderly individuals from cuts to their Social Security benefits required to bring the system into long-term fiscal balance. Social Security benefits will supplant SSI benefits in the future as Social Security benefits rise with real wages and SSI parameters fail to keep pace with inflation. In simulations in which the SSI general income exclusion is increased to its inflation-adjusted level, the percentage of elderly individuals who receive SSI increased, the percentage of elderly individuals who receive larger SSI benefits increased, and the average benefit gain increased. Corresponding effects for the simulation that increased SSI federal benefit rate simulation were somewhat stronger. The option that increased the SSI asset threshold produced the strongest results among the SSI options considered, consistent with previous research. Although poverty rates among the elderly were not substantially reduced, the income of concurrent Social Security-SSI recipients and SSI-only recipients increased markedly relative to the Social Security benefit cut reform. The reform options that included a Social Security minimum benefit, however, produced the strongest results across the board.

This study raises the question of whether it is preferable to meet the needs of the low-income elderly through the Social Security program or through a means-tested social welfare program like SSI. Social Security minimum benefits as specified in our analyses are clearly more effective at reducing poverty among the elderly than the SSI reform options and are better targeted if the goal is to offset lost income due to Social Security benefit cuts. As demonstrated, minimum benefits could be designed in a cost neutral way. This would make the program more redistributive than it is under current law.

Nevertheless, SSI plays a vital income security role for many low-income elderly individuals. Thus, SSI reform is of course another option for protecting this population. The study has revealed that changes to the SSI asset threshold could substantially broaden the program's scope and make inroads toward poverty reduction among the elderly in the wake of OASDI cuts. SSI benefit increases and an increase in the general income exclusion make smaller differences, but could nonetheless benefit some Social Security beneficiaries at the lower end of the income distribution.

In the final analysis, it may be the case that some combination of Social Security minimum benefits and SSI reform would be desirable to protect lower income beneficiaries from across-the-board benefit cuts. The highly stylized minimum benefits options in this paper are tied to work history. At least 15 years of covered work history are required before the minimum benefit provisions become effective. This leaves open the possibility that the most vulnerable Social Security beneficiaries—those with the lowest incomes and the shortest work histories, spouses, and survivors—will fall through the cracks. For those individuals, the SSI program, whether reformed or in its current state, will remain a critically important source of support. However, under a longer time horizon than that used in our MINT-based simulations, we would expect SSI's reach among the elderly to continue to decline in the absence of reform.

Appendix—Sensitivity Analysis

The SSI participation model that we use in MINT includes the number of months of SSI receipt after age 62 as an exogenous explanatory variable. For projections of future SSI participation, this variable is useful in that it increases predictability and smoothes participation patterns over time. However, the assumption of exogeneity is questionable. Moreover, for simulations of SSI policy changes or Social Security reforms that might induce SSI participation among the elderly, this variable might be problematic. To test the sensitivity of our estimates to this specification, we re-estimated the SSI participation model without the SSI history variable. We present the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the alternative specification in appendix table 12. We then re-ran the current law simulation and the simulations for the six reform options using these alternative coefficients. Appendix table 13 presents the results for Social Security and SSI benefit receipt and program cost among the elderly in 2022. The complete set of simulation results, including poverty estimates and winners and losers, is available from the authors.

The coefficients from the alternative specification of the SSI participation model (appendix table 12) differ somewhat from those in the original specification (appendix table 4). The key variable—the expected federal SSI benefit—remains positive and significant, and the marginal effect is stronger. The maximum potential state SSI supplement has a positive and significant effect in the alternative specification, whereas its effect was negative and not significant in the original specification. Three other notable changes are as follows: the coefficient on the age variable is positive (but not significant) in the alternative specification, whereas it is negative and significant in the original specification; the coefficient on the Hispanic indicator is positive and significant in the alternative specification, compared to negative and not significant in the original specification; and, the indicator of less than a high school education is positive and significant in the alternative specification, whereas it is negative and not significant in the original specification. Generally speaking, the changes are improvements. A number of other coefficients changed as well, but were either not significant or did not change sign.

The simulation results based on the alternative specification with respect to Social Security and SSI benefit receipt and program cost (appendix table 13) also differ in important ways from the results based on the original specification (tables 3 and 4). Most notably, the increase in SSI expenditures in wake of the 13 percent benefit cut is more substantial under this option, amounting to a 5.8 percent increase over current law expenditures (compared with a 5.4 percent increase based on the original specification of the SSI participation model).

Correspondingly, increases in SSI receipt in response to the Social Security benefit cuts are larger with the alternative specification. For example, using our original specification, the fraction of persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022 receiving both SSI and Social Security increased from 1.39 percent under current law to 1.81 percent with the 13 percent reduction in Social Security benefits, for a difference of 0.42 percentage points. With the alternative specification of SSI take-up, the fraction increases from 1.48 percent under current law to 1.95 percent with the reduction, for a difference of 0.47 percentage points. This is a far more substantial change.

Once again, these differences suggest the importance of conservative interpretation of our results. However, the overall qualitative picture remains fairly similar regardless of specification of the SSI participation model.

Appendix Table 1. Key Features of MINT

MINT3		
1	Birth cohorts in sample	1926-1964
2	Starting sample	Persons in target cohorts of 1990-93 SIPP with full panel weight
3	Baseline sample size	113,553
4	First projection year	Demographics (except death): 1993; death, earnings, program participation: 2000
5	Last projection year	2027 (2032)
6	Earnings histories 1951-93	Observed from SSER (match rate is about 88 percent)
7	Alignment to OASDI Trustees' Assumptions?	Minimal (average wages, disability and mortality)
8	Method for projecting earnings	Statistical splicing method to age 50, trajectory method from 50 to retirement, retirement model, earnings in retirement/benefit receipt
9	Benefit histories prior to 1993 (OASDI/SSI)	Observed from MBR and SSR

Sources: Panis and Lillard 2002, Toder et al. 1999, 2002.

Appendix Table 2. Summary of Core Processes Modeled in MINT3

Process	Data	Form and predictors
Birth	VS (1999)	Crude age-parity-Hispanicity imputation for women with censored fertility (born >= 1948); does not produce new population members; rather, number of children (by age) is an attribute used to predict wealth, living arrangements
Death	PSID (1968-94); VS 1901-94; Numident	2 equations (by sex), anchored to Vital Statistics; includes socioeconomic differentials and marital status; separate process for the disabled based on earnings splicing method
Marriage / Remarriage	SIPP (1990-91; 1992-93 for fit)	2 equations (by sex); depends on age, marriage order, duration unmarried, education, race, permanent income
Spouse Choice		Open marriage market (spouse is selected from opposite-sex persons in the population, regardless of marital status); match likelihood depends on age, race, education
Divorce	SIPP (1990-91; 1992-93 for fit)	2 equations (by sex); depends on marriage duration, age, time, marriage order, education, and race/Hispanicity
Labor Supply and Earnings	<i>Estimation:</i> 1990-93 SIPP/SSER (1984-99); HRS matched to earnings and pension records (1992-96)	Splicing method (ages 19 through age 50), with key matching variables of age, disability status, education, marital status, recent earnings; trajectory method (fixed effects) from age 51 to retirement; special retirement/beneficiary earnings
Disability / Health	Ages 51 to 67: HRS (1992-98); Ages 68+: SIPP (1990)	2 separate outcomes (health and work limits) from ages 51 to 67, health only age 68 plus; separate entry/exit; predictors include age, sex, race/Hispanicity, education
DI Take-up	SIPP (1990-93)	Splicing method (ages 19 through the normal retirement age); key matching variables include age, disability status, education, marital status, recent earnings
Wealth	<i>Same for both models:</i> PSID (1984-94); SIPP (1990-93)	4 random-effects models for ownership/value given ownership separately for housing and non-housing wealth; additional models for spenddown after first OASDI receipt; key predictors include age, race, marital status, family size, birth cohort, dual-earner status, pension coverage, recent earnings
Pensions	BLS (1999-2000); EBRI/ICI; SIPP (1990-93); PENSIM (PSG) and PIMS models (PBGC)	Uses SIPP self-reports for initial values; simulate job changes and future pensions using PENSIM; use PIMS for defined benefit formulas (with separate procedure for DBs from government jobs); uses EBRI/ICI data for defined contribution plans, including asset allocation <i>Note:</i> includes Defined benefit, defined contribution, IRAs, and Keoghs
OASI Take-Up	SIPP (1990-93) matched to SSER/MBR (starting values not available in DYNASIM)	Eligibility is deterministic; 3 separate equations (separate for workers by lagged earnings, and auxiliary beneficiaries) predict take-up of those eligible for retired worker benefits (ages 62 and older); key predictors include age, disability status, education, marital status, recent earnings, pensions, lifetime earnings, and spouse characteristics; take up of survivor benefits at 60 and 61 is deterministic (i.e., mandatory if earnings are below the exempt amount)
OASDI Benefits	Rule-based	Sophisticated calculator incorporates entire work and marriage histories, auxiliary benefits for spouses/survivors and former spouses, and the retirement earnings test.
SSI Benefits	SIPP (1990-93) matched to SSR (starting values not available in DYNASIM)	Eligibility is deterministic; 2 equations predict take-up of the aged; key predictors include demographics, expected federal benefit, state supplement, shared living arrangements
Aged Living Arrangements	SIPP (1990-93)	Logistic regression that considers health, resources, and kin availability (number of children ever born); resources of coresiding family members are imputed using donor families sampled from current coresiding aged individuals in SIPP.
Immigration	SIPP (1990-93)	Replicate historical distribution of immigrant life histories, using target levels from Dowhan and Duleep (2002), which are based on sex, country of origin, and age at immigration

Abbreviations: BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CPS: Current Population Survey; EBRI: Employee Benefits Research Institute; HRS: Health and Retirement Study; NLSY: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; OCACT: Intermediate assumptions of the OASDI Trustees; PBGC: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation; PIMS: Pension Insurance Modeling System; PSG: Policy Simulation Group; PSID: Panel Study of Income Dynamics; SCF: Survey of Consumer Finances; VS: Vital Statistics

Sources: Panis and Lillard 2002, Toder et al. 1999, 2002.

Appendix Table 3. Descriptive Characteristics of SSI Eligible Individuals, Aged 65 and Over, Combined 1991 and 1997 Samples

Variable	Definition	Mean	Std. Dev
onssi	Indicator of SSI receipt in reference month	0.563	0.496
fssidol97	Expected federal SSI benefit (1997 dollars)	237.10	187.23
stsupamt	Maximum potential SSI state supplement	56.26	104.67
ssihist_62	Number of months of SSI receipt since age 62	59.65	72.62
share30	Shared living arrangements indicator	0.320	0.467
tage	Individual's age	74.35	6.26
female	Female indicator	0.725	0.447
hispanic	Hispanic indicator	0.164	0.371
black	Black indicator	0.284	0.451
amind	Native American indicator	0.009	0.096
asian	Asian indicator	0.076	0.266
widow	Widowed indicator	0.463	0.499
divsep	Divorced or separated indicator	0.181	0.385
nevermar	Never married indicator	0.110	0.313
fb	Foreign born indicator	0.294	0.456
ysm	Years since migration to the U.S.	3.91	9.21
ysm2	Square of years since migration to the U.S.	100.09	298.29
ysm3	Cube of years since migration to the U.S.	3022.32	10537.19
lesshs	Indicator of less than high school education	0.757	0.429
morehs	Indicator of more than high school education	0.077	0.266
ownhome	Home ownership indicator	0.377	0.485
unitpension	Indicator that individual or spouse received pension income	0.047	0.212
unitss	Indicator that individual or spouse received Social Security income	0.704	0.457
fairpoorhth	Indicator of self-reported fair or poor health	0.546	0.498
south	Indicator of residence in the South	0.490	0.500
Number of observations		1390	

Source: Authors' calculations from the 1991 and 1997 SSI Financial Eligibility Model (1990 and 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation, matched to SSA administrative data).

Appendix Table 4. Probit Estimates of SSI Participation Among SSI Eligible Individuals Aged 65 and Over, Combined 1991 and 1997 Samples

Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Marginal Effects
fssidol97	0.0010** [0.0004]	0.0003** [0.0001]
stsupamt	-0.0004 [0.0006]	-0.0001 [0.0002]
tage	-0.0628*** [0.0091]	-0.0194*** [0.0030]
female	-0.2273* [0.1198]	-0.0675* [0.0345]
hispanic	-0.1074 [0.1656]	-0.0340 [0.0536]
black	-0.0256 [0.1213]	-0.0079 [0.0378]
amind	-0.1140 [0.5432]	-0.0366 [0.1806]
asian	-0.2185 [0.2242]	-0.0717 [0.0776]
widow	0.2563* [0.1450]	0.0785* [0.0443]
divsep	0.1851 [0.1661]	0.0547 [0.0471]
nevermar	0.3774** [0.1846]	0.1036** [0.0445]
unitpension	-0.2348 [0.2349]	-0.0777 [0.0825]
unitss	0.3436* [0.1761]	0.1109* [0.0595]
lesshs	-0.1283 [0.1308]	-0.0387 [0.0384]
morehs	-0.2052 [0.2004]	-0.0671 [0.0688]
fb	0.2572 [0.1892]	0.0762 [0.0538]
ysm	0.1358** [0.0596]	0.0419** [0.0185]
ysm2	-0.0104*** [0.0040]	-0.0032** [0.0013]
ysm3	0.0002** [0.0001]	0.0001** [0.0000]
ownhome	-0.2837** [0.1109]	-0.0896** [0.0360]
fairpoorhlth	0.0969 [0.1023]	0.0300 [0.0318]
share30	0.2779** [0.1113]	0.0826** [0.0321]
ssihist_62	0.0302*** [0.0015]	0.0093*** [0.0004]
south	0.0871 [0.1246]	0.0269 [0.0384]
year	-0.0307* [0.0184]	-0.0095* [0.0057]
Constant	5.9733*** [1.8952]	----- -----
Observations	1390	
Log L	-407.19	
Pseudo R2	0.57	

Notes: Standard errors in brackets.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Source: Authors' calculations from the 1991 and 1997 SSI Financial Eligibility Model (1990 and 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation, matched to SSA administrative data).

Appendix Table 5. Percent of Persons Ages 65 to 78 at Risk of Poverty and Near Poverty in 2022 Under Current Law and Different Options for Reducing Social Security Benefits

	Current Law (Promised)			OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%			Column 1 with GR- Financed Minimum			Column 1 with Cut- Financed Minimum			Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase			Column 1 with 13% SSI Increase			Column 1 with Asset Threshold I	
	(0)		(1)	(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)								
	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty	Total Income <100% Poverty	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty	Total Income <100% Poverty	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty	Total Income <100% Poverty	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty	Total Income <100% Poverty	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty	Total Income <100% Poverty	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty	Total Income <100% Poverty	Total OASDI < 100% Poverty	Total Income <125% Poverty
All	13.9	6.2	4.0	17.1	7.4	4.8	14.1	6.5	3.9	14.6	6.7	4.0	17.1	7.4	4.7	17.1	7.4	4.6	17.1	7.3
All Men	13.0	4.9	3.2	15.6	5.6	3.7	13.5	4.9	3.1	14.0	5.0	3.1	15.6	5.6	3.6	15.6	5.6	3.5	15.6	5.5
Never Married Men	30.9	19.5	13.7	35.1	21.8	14.5	26.3	18.9	12.0	26.3	18.9	12.0	35.1	21.8	14.5	35.1	21.8	14.5	35.1	21.8
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	41.2	8.8	7.2	47.0	9.2	7.6	46.9	9.0	6.9	49.0	9.0	6.9	47.0	9.2	7.6	47.0	9.2	7.3	47.0	8.7
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	3.7	1.5	0.8	4.5	1.8	1.0	3.4	1.2	0.7	3.4	1.3	0.8	4.5	1.7	0.9	4.5	1.7	0.8	4.5	1.7
Widowed Men	9.7	6.2	3.5	14.0	7.9	4.7	11.2	7.3	4.2	11.5	7.8	4.3	14.0	7.9	4.7	14.0	7.9	4.5	14.0	7.9
Divorced Men	15.3	9.2	5.1	20.4	11.1	6.4	14.5	9.6	5.0	15.5	9.8	5.0	20.4	11.1	6.4	20.4	11.1	6.4	20.4	11.1
All Women	14.5	7.2	4.6	18.3	8.8	5.7	14.5	7.2	4.6	15.0	8.1	4.7	18.3	8.8	5.6	18.3	8.8	5.4	18.3	8.7
Never Married Women	32.7	15.3	11.1	37.3	16.6	11.7	28.4	14.8	8.5	29.1	15.0	8.5	37.3	16.6	11.7	37.3	16.6	11.5	37.3	16.7
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	74.4	17.6	16.1	77.8	17.7	16.4	77.8	17.4	15.8	79.4	17.4	15.8	77.8	17.7	16.2	77.8	17.7	14.8	77.8	15.8
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	3.4	1.6	0.7	4.3	1.9	0.9	2.8	1.4	0.7	3.0	1.5	0.7	4.3	1.9	0.8	4.3	1.9	0.8	4.3	1.8
Widowed Women	13.6	10.2	6.3	20.6	13.7	9.0	17.5	13.0	7.7	18.3	13.8	8.1	20.6	13.7	9.0	20.6	13.7	8.5	20.6	13.8
Divorced Women	23.2	13.0	7.5	30.2	16.0	9.4	21.0	13.5	6.9	21.6	14.0	7.1	30.2	16.0	9.4	30.2	16.0	9.4	30.2	16.0
Age By Sex in 2022																				
Men																				
65-69	17.7	5.5	3.7	22.0	6.3	4.4	19.2	5.5	3.6	20.1	5.7	3.6	22.0	6.3	4.3	22.0	6.3	4.1	22.0	6.2
70-74	9.4	4.7	2.8	10.8	5.4	3.3	9.1	4.7	2.6	9.3	4.7	2.7	10.8	5.4	3.1	10.8	5.4	3.1	10.8	5.4
75-79	8.9	4.1	2.9	9.5	4.4	3.0	8.1	4.1	2.8	8.3	4.0	2.8	9.5	4.4	2.9	9.5	4.4	3.0	9.5	4.2
Women																				
65-69	16.8	7.1	4.3	21.9	9.1	5.7	17.0	7.1	4.5	17.6	8.0	4.7	21.9	9.0	5.7	21.9	9.0	5.5	21.9	8.9
70-74	12.4	6.7	4.3	15.4	8.2	5.2	12.4	6.7	4.2	12.7	7.6	4.2	15.4	8.2	5.1	15.4	8.2	4.9	15.4	8.1
75-79	13.5	8.3	5.6	15.7	9.3	6.4	13.3	8.3	5.4	13.7	9.0	5.5	15.7	9.3	6.3	15.7	9.3	6.0	15.7	9.3
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																				
Bottom	79.8	39.4	35.4	81.6	40.7	36.7	81.3	40.5	36.7	81.9	40.9	36.8	81.6	40.7	36.5	81.6	40.6	33.7	81.6	39.5
Second	37.9	19.6	12.1	46.0	23.2	15.2	37.9	20.3	11.7	38.7	21.1	12.0	46.0	23.2	14.7	46.0	23.2	14.6	46.0	22.9
Third	9.0	4.3	1.0	15.5	6.2	2.2	9.4	4.7	0.7	10.4	4.9	0.9	15.5	6.2	2.1	15.5	6.2	2.1	15.5	6.3
Fourth	3.0	0.2	0.0	3.6	0.5	0.0	3.3	0.3	0.0	3.4	0.4	0.0	3.6	0.5	0.0	3.6	0.5	0.0	3.6	0.5
Top	2.9	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0
Joint SSI-OASDI Type																				
Neither	100.0	28.5	27.6	100.0	28.5	27.6	99.4	28.5	27.6	99.6	28.5	27.6	100.0	28.5	27.6	100.0	28.5	27.5	100.0	26.6
Soc Sec, no SSI	7.6	3.7	1.6	11.1	5.0	2.5	8.0	4.1	1.5	8.5	4.3	1.6	11.1	5.0	2.4	11.1	5.0	2.4	11.1	4.9
Both Soc Sec and SSI	93.4	57.9	48.3	94.8	57.9	48.3	86.6	56.7	46.0	86.6	56.7	46.0	94.8	57.3	43.6	94.8	57.3	43.7	94.8	58.1
SSI, no Soc Sec	100.0	55.0	51.8	100.0	55.0	51.8	100.0	55.0	51.8	100.0	55.0	51.8	100.0	55.0	51.8	100.0	54.9	41.7	100.0	55.0

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62.

Total family income is the sum of income from earnings, assets, pensions (including defined benefit pensions, defined contribution pensions, IRAs and Keogh accounts), Social Security, and SSI for individuals and, where applicable, their spouses and coresident family members.

Appendix Table 6. Winners and Losers in 2022 After Implementation of 13 Percent OASDI Benefit Reduction

	N	Social Security				Supplemental Security Income								Combined O		
		Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing	Average Loss (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining (< 125% poverty)	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing
All	46,483	\$20,031	\$18,362	92.8	-\$1,798	\$141	\$149	1.6	\$536	\$1,213	\$1,291	15.5	\$497	\$20,172	\$18,512	91.66
All Men	20,714	\$21,136	\$19,403	93.2	-\$1,858	\$110	\$117	1.3	\$482	\$1,031	\$1,105	17.0	\$435	\$21,246	\$19,520	92.3
Never Married Men	790	\$11,816	\$10,729	92.9	-\$1,171	\$363	\$394	7.8	\$395	\$1,404	\$1,504	27.6	\$362	\$12,179	\$11,123	86.6
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	6,251	\$12,041	\$10,795	74.3	-\$1,677	\$375	\$378	0.7	\$413	\$1,593	\$1,611	4.4	\$415	\$12,416	\$11,173	73.8
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	9,873	\$26,639	\$24,563	98.0	-\$2,120	\$29	\$32	0.7	\$526	\$706	\$788	24.1	\$341	\$26,667	\$24,595	97.5
Widowed Men	1,218	\$15,170	\$13,857	94.4	-\$1,390	\$88	\$97	1.5	\$680	\$835	\$928	12.1	\$768	\$15,257	\$13,955	93.5
Divorced Men	2,582	\$14,286	\$13,032	94.7	-\$1,325	\$74	\$85	2.3	\$498	\$426	\$531	19.5	\$536	\$14,359	\$13,117	93.1
All Women	25,769	\$19,134	\$17,518	92.4	-\$1,750	\$166	\$176	1.8	\$567	\$1,315	\$1,394	14.7	\$536	\$12,273	\$11,276	78.8
Never Married Women	1,944	\$11,688	\$10,674	83.3	-\$1,217	\$586	\$602	4.9	\$342	\$2,064	\$2,127	19.0	\$331	\$12,273	\$11,276	78.8
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	3,151	\$5,953	\$5,336	47.7	-\$1,295	\$834	\$836	0.5	\$299	\$2,057	\$2,060	1.4	\$189	\$6,788	\$6,172	47.3
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	10,277	\$26,312	\$24,130	97.8	-\$2,231	\$38	\$44	1.0	\$648	\$742	\$835	22.7	\$410	\$26,349	\$24,174	97.1
Widowed Women	6,045	\$13,735	\$12,513	91.5	-\$1,336	\$217	\$232	1.7	\$888	\$1,514	\$1,623	10.8	\$1,007	\$13,952	\$12,745	90.9
Divorced Women	4,352	\$12,600	\$11,535	93.7	-\$1,136	\$129	\$143	3.2	\$439	\$776	\$856	18.3	\$436	\$12,730	\$11,679	91.3
Age By Sex in 2022																
Men																
65-69	9,422	\$19,526	\$17,231	90.7	-\$2,530	\$97	\$104	1.3	\$608	\$1,003	\$1,082	14.6	\$543	\$19,623	\$17,336	89.8
70-74	7,232	\$22,724	\$21,107	95.1	-\$1,700	\$124	\$130	1.2	\$477	\$977	\$1,047	16.4	\$428	\$22,849	\$21,237	94.4
75-79	4,060	\$22,039	\$21,414	95.9	-\$651	\$117	\$121	1.7	\$271	\$1,228	\$1,293	25.6	\$252	\$22,155	\$21,535	94.3
Women																
65-69	10,691	\$19,090	\$16,809	90.4	-\$2,522	\$136	\$146	1.4	\$768	\$1,051	\$1,126	10.4	\$714	\$19,226	\$16,956	89.6
70-74	9,257	\$19,741	\$18,290	94.1	-\$1,542	\$169	\$180	2.2	\$488	\$1,295	\$1,389	19.7	\$475	\$19,910	\$18,470	92.4
75-79	5,821	\$18,201	\$17,625	93.5	-\$616	\$219	\$227	1.8	\$414	\$1,793	\$1,860	15.2	\$438	\$18,421	\$17,852	92.3
By Joint OASDI-SSI Status																
Neither OASDI or SSI	8,494	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	0.0	.	\$0	\$0	0.0	.	\$0	\$0	.
OASDI only	35,218	\$21,409	\$19,625	98.4	-\$1,815	\$0	\$3	0.5	\$650	\$0	\$50	7.7	\$648	\$21,409	\$19,628	98.3
Both OASDI and SSI	873	\$6,178	\$5,758	82.4	-\$511	\$2,619	\$3,025	82.4	\$494	\$2,158	\$2,537	86.3	\$439	\$8,797	\$8,783	4.7
SSI only	1,898	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,327	.	.	\$7,366	\$7,366	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,327	.
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																
Bottom	9,481	\$3,769	\$3,500	30.3	-\$891	\$1,987	\$2,007	4.3	\$458	\$2,637	\$2,668	7.0	\$442	\$5,756	\$5,507	26.7
Second	8,839	\$11,605	\$10,606	86.7	-\$1,153	\$241	\$284	7.7	\$558	\$673	\$799	24.3	\$519	\$11,846	\$10,890	81.1
Third	9,397	\$17,084	\$15,603	97.9	-\$1,513	\$5	\$8	0.5	\$469	\$77	\$103	6.8	\$374	\$17,089	\$15,611	97.6
Fourth	9,604	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2	-\$1,934	\$0	\$0	0.0	\$96	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2
Top	9,162	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0	-\$2,298	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0
By Years Worked																
Zero Workyrs	8,821	\$2,818	\$2,669	14.6	-\$1,023	\$1,691	\$1,703	2.5	\$459	\$2,301	\$2,320	4.1	\$469	\$4,510	\$4,372	12.6
1-19	9,672	\$14,770	\$13,622	82.2	-\$1,397	\$453	\$481	5.5	\$506	\$1,575	\$1,669	20.9	\$449	\$15,223	\$14,102	78.0
20-29	7,157	\$18,622	\$17,059	98.1	-\$1,593	\$22	\$33	1.9	\$617	\$113	\$223	18.1	\$610	\$18,644	\$17,092	97.1
30-34	6,570	\$20,915	\$19,129	98.9	-\$1,806	\$5	\$8	0.5	\$672	\$60	\$125	9.5	\$679	\$20,920	\$19,137	98.6
35+	14,263	\$23,871	\$21,865	98.1	-\$2,045	\$1	\$1	0.1	\$439	\$10	\$36	7.4	\$338	\$23,872	\$21,866	98.1
By Health Status																
Excellent/Good/Very Good	30,953	\$20,973	\$19,216	93.6	-\$1,896	\$92	\$104	1.4	\$890	\$1,168	\$1,237	14.9	\$461	\$20,973	\$19,216	92.7
Fair or Poor	15,530	\$18,293	\$16,861	91.0	-\$1,605	\$194	\$210	2.0	\$764	\$1,269	\$1,356	16.3	\$537	\$18,293	\$16,861	89.3

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62. For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range). Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

Appendix Table 7. Winners and Losers in 2022 After Implementation of 13 Percent OASDI Benefit Reduction Combined with a General-Revenue Financed Minimum Benefit for

	N	Social Security				Supplemental Security Income								Combined		
		Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing	Average Loss (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing
All	46,483	\$20,031	\$18,896	78.2	-\$1,739	\$141	\$136	0.7	\$438	\$1,213	\$1,183	7.6	\$401	\$20,172	\$19,033	77.62
All Men	20,714	\$21,136	\$19,954	78.1	-\$1,812	\$110	\$106	0.6	\$389	\$1,031	\$984	7.6	\$324	\$21,246	\$20,061	77.6
Never Married Men	790	\$11,816	\$11,241	69.4	-\$1,287	\$363	\$339	3.2	\$424	\$1,404	\$1,272	9.5	\$329	\$12,179	\$11,580	66.8
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	6,251	\$12,041	\$11,077	64.6	-\$1,737	\$375	\$373	0.4	\$419	\$1,593	\$1,606	2.9	\$477	\$12,416	\$11,450	64.2
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	9,873	\$26,639	\$25,296	79.7	-\$2,043	\$29	\$26	0.3	\$376	\$706	\$661	15.6	\$277	\$26,667	\$25,323	79.4
Widowed Men	1,218	\$15,170	\$14,010	90.9	-\$1,327	\$88	\$92	0.9	\$496	\$835	\$854	3.5	\$540	\$15,257	\$14,102	90.0
Divorced Men	2,582	\$14,286	\$13,311	84.0	-\$1,346	\$74	\$64	0.8	\$296	\$426	\$355	7.1	\$292	\$14,359	\$13,376	83.3
All Women	25,769	\$19,134	\$18,038	78.2	-\$1,679	\$166	\$161	0.9	\$466	\$1,315	\$1,294	7.5	\$444	\$12,273	\$11,645	65.5
Never Married Women	1,944	\$11,688	\$11,079	67.9	-\$1,286	\$586	\$567	2.4	\$311	\$2,064	\$2,018	9.7	\$266	\$12,273	\$11,645	65.5
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	3,151	\$5,953	\$5,738	34.2	-\$1,416	\$834	\$826	0.1	\$32	\$2,057	\$2,043	0.8	\$32	\$6,788	\$6,564	34.1
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	10,277	\$26,312	\$24,880	79.7	-\$2,141	\$38	\$32	0.4	\$465	\$742	\$671	11.5	\$309	\$26,349	\$24,912	79.4
Widowed Women	6,045	\$13,735	\$12,661	88.5	-\$1,252	\$217	\$223	1.1	\$666	\$1,514	\$1,554	7.1	\$728	\$13,952	\$12,883	88.1
Divorced Women	4,352	\$12,600	\$11,954	77.2	-\$1,154	\$129	\$120	1.4	\$395	\$776	\$723	8.0	\$383	\$12,730	\$12,073	76.2
Age By Sex in 2022																
Men																
65-69	9,422	\$19,526	\$17,900	77.2	-\$2,411	\$97	\$94	0.6	\$494	\$1,003	\$965	6.7	\$407	\$19,623	\$17,994	76.7
70-74	7,232	\$22,724	\$21,581	81.4	-\$1,650	\$124	\$121	0.4	\$382	\$977	\$939	5.6	\$334	\$22,849	\$21,702	81.1
75-79	4,060	\$22,039	\$21,828	74.2	-\$677	\$117	\$109	0.8	\$210	\$1,228	\$1,133	14.6	\$197	\$22,155	\$21,937	73.4
Women																
65-69	10,691	\$19,090	\$17,504	76.7	-\$2,372	\$136	\$132	0.7	\$661	\$1,051	\$1,048	5.4	\$616	\$19,226	\$17,636	76.3
70-74	9,257	\$19,741	\$18,714	80.7	-\$1,508	\$169	\$164	1.1	\$391	\$1,295	\$1,277	10.5	\$392	\$19,910	\$18,879	79.8
75-79	5,821	\$18,201	\$17,960	77.0	-\$608	\$219	\$212	0.8	\$311	\$1,793	\$1,735	7.2	\$328	\$18,421	\$18,172	76.5
By Joint OASDI-SSI Status																
Neither OASDI or SSI	8,494	\$0	\$97	.	.	\$0	\$0	0.0	.	\$0	\$0	0.0	.	\$0	\$97	.
OASDI only	35,218	\$21,409	\$20,178	83.3	-\$1,748	\$0	\$1	0.2	\$547	\$0	\$18	3.2	\$558	\$21,409	\$20,179	83.3
Both OASDI and SSI	873	\$6,178	\$6,811	40.0	-\$421	\$2,619	\$2,224	40.2	\$405	\$2,158	\$1,845	44.2	\$352	\$8,797	\$9,035	2.8
SSI only	1,898	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,327	.	.	\$7,366	\$7,366	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,327	.
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																
Bottom	9,481	\$3,769	\$3,586	27.8	-\$872	\$1,987	\$1,979	3.5	\$488	\$2,637	\$2,639	6.0	\$465	\$5,756	\$5,565	24.9
Second	8,839	\$11,605	\$11,542	56.1	-\$1,100	\$241	\$217	3.3	\$424	\$673	\$619	10.7	\$388	\$11,846	\$11,759	53.8
Third	9,397	\$17,084	\$16,507	70.7	-\$1,344	\$5	\$4	0.1	\$392	\$77	\$49	1.8	\$200	\$17,089	\$16,511	70.7
Fourth	9,604	\$22,930	\$21,447	89.6	-\$1,770	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$22,930	\$21,447	89.6
Top	9,162	\$27,651	\$25,572	95.4	-\$2,234	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$27,651	\$25,572	95.4
By Years Worked																
Zero Workyrs	8,821	\$2,818	\$2,744	12.7	-\$965	\$1,691	\$1,680	2.0	\$487	\$2,301	\$2,311	3.8	\$469	\$4,510	\$4,424	11.3
1-19	9,672	\$14,770	\$13,961	69.8	-\$1,418	\$453	\$444	3.3	\$436	\$1,575	\$1,546	13.0	\$397	\$15,223	\$14,406	67.3
20-29	7,157	\$18,622	\$17,750	76.7	-\$1,525	\$22	\$13	0.3	\$407	\$113	\$43	3.0	\$356	\$18,644	\$17,762	76.6
30-34	6,570	\$20,915	\$19,925	77.7	-\$1,707	\$5	\$1	0.0	\$413	\$60	\$6	0.3	\$413	\$20,920	\$19,926	77.7
35+	14,263	\$23,871	\$22,334	87.5	-\$1,957	\$1	\$0	.	.	\$10	\$0	.	.	\$23,872	\$22,334	87.5
By Health Status																
Excellent/Good/Very Good	30,953	\$20,973	\$19,709	80.4	-\$1,825	\$92	\$97	0.9	\$672	\$1,168	\$1,142	7.7	\$345	\$20,973	\$19,709	80.0
Fair or Poor	15,530	\$18,293	\$17,448	72.9	-\$1,543	\$194	\$181	0.7	\$620	\$1,269	\$1,233	7.5	\$471	\$18,293	\$17,448	72.1

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62. For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range). Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

Appendix Table 8. Winners and Losers in 2022 After Implementation of 13 Percent OASDI Benefit Reduction Combined with a Cut-Financed Minimum Benefit for OASDI

	N	Social Security				Supplemental Security Income								Combined		
		Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing	Average Loss (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing
All	46,483	\$20,031	\$18,365	79.8	-\$2,339	\$141	\$138	0.8	\$572	\$1,213	\$1,194	7.8	\$525	\$20,172	\$18,503	79.27
All Men	20,714	\$21,136	\$19,391	79.8	-\$2,445	\$110	\$107	0.6	\$528	\$1,031	\$996	8.0	\$459	\$21,246	\$19,498	79.3
Never Married Men	790	\$11,816	\$10,934	69.4	-\$1,729	\$363	\$344	3.2	\$577	\$1,404	\$1,287	9.5	\$487	\$12,179	\$11,278	66.8
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	6,251	\$12,041	\$10,681	64.7	-\$2,309	\$375	\$374	0.4	\$559	\$1,593	\$1,610	2.9	\$627	\$12,416	\$11,054	64.4
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	9,873	\$26,639	\$24,611	82.6	-\$2,753	\$29	\$27	0.4	\$558	\$706	\$691	16.5	\$437	\$26,667	\$24,638	82.3
Widowed Men	1,218	\$15,170	\$13,603	91.0	-\$1,782	\$88	\$93	1.1	\$497	\$835	\$858	5.6	\$417	\$15,257	\$13,695	90.1
Divorced Men	2,582	\$14,286	\$12,912	84.0	-\$1,817	\$74	\$65	0.8	\$411	\$426	\$363	7.1	\$404	\$14,359	\$12,977	83.4
All Women	25,769	\$19,134	\$17,533	79.8	-\$2,253	\$166	\$162	0.9	\$596	\$1,315	\$1,304	7.8	\$563	\$12,273	\$11,329	65.6
Never Married Women	1,944	\$11,688	\$10,760	68.0	-\$1,743	\$586	\$570	2.6	\$402	\$2,064	\$2,028	9.7	\$370	\$12,273	\$11,329	65.6
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	3,151	\$5,953	\$5,568	34.2	-\$1,851	\$834	\$826	0.2	\$95	\$2,057	\$2,044	1.3	\$95	\$6,788	\$6,394	33.9
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	10,277	\$26,312	\$24,190	82.9	-\$2,845	\$38	\$33	0.5	\$635	\$742	\$691	12.4	\$423	\$26,349	\$24,223	82.7
Widowed Women	6,045	\$13,735	\$12,283	88.5	-\$1,676	\$217	\$224	1.1	\$788	\$1,514	\$1,562	7.1	\$839	\$13,952	\$12,507	88.1
Divorced Women	4,352	\$12,600	\$11,635	77.2	-\$1,565	\$129	\$122	1.4	\$541	\$776	\$737	8.2	\$532	\$12,730	\$11,757	76.2
Age By Sex in 2022																
Men																
65-69	9,422	\$19,526	\$17,294	78.4	-\$3,117	\$97	\$95	0.6	\$656	\$1,003	\$978	7.1	\$573	\$19,623	\$17,389	77.9
70-74	7,232	\$22,724	\$21,029	83.0	-\$2,255	\$124	\$121	0.5	\$507	\$977	\$947	6.0	\$439	\$22,849	\$21,150	82.7
75-79	4,060	\$22,039	\$21,345	77.3	-\$1,215	\$117	\$110	0.8	\$318	\$1,228	\$1,150	14.6	\$305	\$22,155	\$21,455	76.5
Women																
65-69	10,691	\$19,090	\$16,927	78.1	-\$3,045	\$136	\$133	0.7	\$780	\$1,051	\$1,058	5.8	\$742	\$19,226	\$17,061	77.8
70-74	9,257	\$19,741	\$18,234	82.1	-\$2,043	\$169	\$166	1.1	\$529	\$1,295	\$1,289	10.5	\$507	\$19,910	\$18,400	81.3
75-79	5,821	\$18,201	\$17,558	79.2	-\$1,063	\$219	\$213	0.8	\$437	\$1,793	\$1,744	7.4	\$432	\$18,421	\$17,771	78.7
By Joint OASDI-SSI Status																
Neither OASDI or SSI	8,494	\$0	\$49	.	.	\$0	\$0	0.0	.	\$0	\$0	0.0	.	\$0	\$49	.
OASDI only	35,218	\$21,409	\$19,611	85.1	-\$2,351	\$0	\$1	0.2	\$693	\$0	\$25	3.6	\$694	\$21,409	\$19,612	85.1
Both OASDI and SSI	873	\$6,178	\$6,745	40.1	-\$555	\$2,619	\$2,285	40.5	\$531	\$2,158	\$1,899	44.5	\$466	\$8,797	\$9,030	2.8
SSI only	1,898	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,327	.	.	\$7,366	\$7,366	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,327	.
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																
Bottom	9,481	\$3,769	\$3,492	27.9	-\$1,196	\$1,987	\$1,983	3.6	\$611	\$2,637	\$2,648	6.1	\$587	\$5,756	\$5,476	25.0
Second	8,839	\$11,605	\$11,324	57.2	-\$1,427	\$241	\$223	3.4	\$565	\$673	\$635	11.0	\$514	\$11,846	\$11,547	54.9
Third	9,397	\$17,084	\$16,136	73.4	-\$1,748	\$5	\$4	0.2	\$497	\$77	\$53	2.1	\$341	\$17,089	\$16,140	73.3
Fourth	9,604	\$22,930	\$20,819	91.8	-\$2,386	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$22,930	\$20,819	91.8
Top	9,162	\$27,651	\$24,733	96.2	-\$3,070	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$27,651	\$24,733	96.2
By Years Worked																
Zero Workyrs	8,821	\$2,818	\$2,686	12.8	-\$1,395	\$1,691	\$1,683	2.0	\$630	\$2,301	\$2,316	3.8	\$607	\$4,510	\$4,369	11.4
1-19	9,672	\$14,770	\$13,586	70.5	-\$1,921	\$453	\$450	3.4	\$577	\$1,575	\$1,564	13.4	\$521	\$15,223	\$14,036	68.0
20-29	7,157	\$18,622	\$17,298	78.7	-\$2,034	\$22	\$13	0.4	\$475	\$113	\$50	3.6	\$485	\$18,644	\$17,312	78.6
30-34	6,570	\$20,915	\$19,395	80.1	-\$2,272	\$5	\$1	0.0	\$413	\$60	\$6	0.3	\$413	\$20,920	\$19,396	80.1
35+	14,263	\$23,871	\$21,663	89.2	-\$2,641	\$1	\$0	.	.	\$10	\$0	.	.	\$23,872	\$21,664	89.2
By Health Status																
Excellent/Good/Very Good	30,953	\$20,973	\$19,146	82.0	-\$2,453	\$92	\$99	1.0	\$812	\$1,168	\$1,153	7.9	\$472	\$20,973	\$19,146	81.6
Fair or Poor	15,530	\$18,293	\$16,996	74.7	-\$2,080	\$194	\$183	0.8	\$672	\$1,269	\$1,244	7.8	\$591	\$18,293	\$16,996	73.9

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62. For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range). Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

Appendix Table 9. Winners and Losers in 2022 After Implementation of 13 Percent OASDI Benefit Reduction Combined with an Increase in SSI General Income Exclusion

	N	Social Security				Supplemental Security Income								Combined		
		Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing	Average Loss (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing
All	46,483	\$20,031	\$18,362	92.8	-\$1,798	\$141	\$165	2.3	\$1,051	\$1,213	\$1,440	21.9	\$1,037	\$20,172	\$18,527	91.3
All Men	20,714	\$21,136	\$19,403	93.2	-\$1,858	\$110	\$130	2.0	\$979	\$1,031	\$1,262	24.0	\$961	\$21,246	\$19,533	92.0
Never Married Men	790	\$11,816	\$10,729	92.9	-\$1,171	\$363	\$459	9.4	\$1,023	\$1,404	\$1,717	31.2	\$1,006	\$12,179	\$11,188	84.5
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	6,251	\$12,041	\$10,795	74.3	-\$1,677	\$375	\$386	1.4	\$804	\$1,593	\$1,651	6.8	\$864	\$12,416	\$11,181	73.6
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	9,873	\$26,639	\$24,563	98.0	-\$2,120	\$29	\$40	1.2	\$975	\$706	\$1,043	40.3	\$837	\$26,667	\$24,603	97.3
Widowed Men	1,218	\$15,170	\$13,857	94.4	-\$1,390	\$88	\$114	2.4	\$1,093	\$835	\$1,092	24.6	\$1,049	\$15,257	\$13,972	93.0
Divorced Men	2,582	\$14,286	\$13,032	94.7	-\$1,325	\$74	\$106	3.3	\$985	\$426	\$702	26.1	\$1,058	\$14,359	\$13,137	92.6
All Women	25,769	\$19,134	\$17,518	92.4	-\$1,750	\$166	\$193	2.5	\$1,098	\$1,315	\$1,540	20.7	\$1,086	\$12,273	\$11,316	78.0
Never Married Women	1,944	\$11,688	\$10,674	83.3	-\$1,217	\$586	\$642	6.0	\$939	\$2,064	\$2,276	22.9	\$927	\$12,273	\$11,316	78.0
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	3,151	\$5,953	\$5,336	47.7	-\$1,295	\$834	\$842	0.9	\$874	\$2,057	\$2,074	1.9	\$836	\$6,788	\$6,178	47.3
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	10,277	\$26,312	\$24,130	97.8	-\$2,231	\$38	\$53	1.4	\$1,130	\$742	\$1,060	36.1	\$882	\$26,349	\$24,183	96.8
Widowed Women	6,045	\$13,735	\$12,513	91.5	-\$1,336	\$217	\$254	2.7	\$1,356	\$1,514	\$1,781	18.8	\$1,420	\$13,952	\$12,767	90.5
Divorced Women	4,352	\$12,600	\$11,535	93.7	-\$1,136	\$129	\$171	4.3	\$975	\$776	\$1,009	22.9	\$1,015	\$12,730	\$11,706	90.6
Age By Sex in 2022																
Men																
65-69	9,422	\$19,526	\$17,231	90.7	-\$2,530	\$97	\$118	2.0	\$1,055	\$1,003	\$1,223	21.0	\$1,046	\$19,623	\$17,349	89.5
70-74	7,232	\$22,724	\$21,107	95.1	-\$1,700	\$124	\$142	2.0	\$918	\$977	\$1,203	25.3	\$895	\$22,849	\$21,249	93.9
75-79	4,060	\$22,039	\$21,414	95.9	-\$651	\$117	\$135	2.0	\$911	\$1,228	\$1,502	30.8	\$890	\$22,155	\$21,549	94.1
Women																
65-69	10,691	\$19,090	\$16,809	90.4	-\$2,522	\$136	\$161	2.0	\$1,243	\$1,051	\$1,242	16.0	\$1,197	\$19,226	\$16,970	89.3
70-74	9,257	\$19,741	\$18,290	94.1	-\$1,542	\$169	\$199	2.9	\$1,026	\$1,295	\$1,555	25.4	\$1,022	\$19,910	\$18,489	92.0
75-79	5,821	\$18,201	\$17,625	93.5	-\$616	\$219	\$246	2.7	\$1,010	\$1,793	\$2,026	22.2	\$1,050	\$18,421	\$17,872	91.8
By Joint OASDI-SSI Status																
Neither OASDI or SSI	8,494	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$12	0.4	\$2,930	\$0	\$41	1.4	\$2,953	\$0	\$12	.
OASDI only	35,218	\$21,409	\$19,625	98.4	-\$1,815	\$0	\$8	0.8	\$961	\$0	\$128	13.6	\$942	\$21,409	\$19,632	98.0
Both OASDI and SSI	873	\$6,178	\$5,758	82.4	-\$511	\$2,619	\$3,730	100.0	\$1,111	\$2,158	\$3,240	100.0	\$1,081	\$8,797	\$9,487	0.2
SSI only	1,898	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,377	8.1	\$628	\$7,366	\$7,423	8.3	\$686	\$7,327	\$7,377	.
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																
Bottom	9,481	\$3,769	\$3,500	30.3	-\$891	\$1,987	\$2,060	8.0	\$923	\$2,637	\$2,751	11.9	\$955	\$5,756	\$5,560	26.1
Second	8,839	\$11,605	\$10,606	86.7	-\$1,153	\$241	\$355	10.1	\$1,126	\$673	\$1,022	31.6	\$1,102	\$11,846	\$10,961	79.4
Third	9,397	\$17,084	\$15,603	97.9	-\$1,513	\$5	\$14	1.0	\$795	\$77	\$173	13.3	\$720	\$17,089	\$15,616	97.4
Fourth	9,604	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2	-\$1,934	\$0	\$0	0.0	\$454	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2
Top	9,162	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0	-\$2,298	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0
By Years Worked																
Zero Workyrs	8,821	\$2,818	\$2,669	14.6	-\$1,023	\$1,691	\$1,737	5.1	\$885	\$2,301	\$2,379	8.4	\$932	\$4,510	\$4,405	12.3
1-19	9,672	\$14,770	\$13,622	82.2	-\$1,397	\$453	\$535	7.6	\$1,074	\$1,575	\$1,872	28.1	\$1,058	\$15,223	\$14,157	76.9
20-29	7,157	\$18,622	\$17,059	98.1	-\$1,593	\$22	\$50	2.5	\$1,144	\$113	\$380	23.9	\$1,119	\$18,644	\$17,109	96.5
30-34	6,570	\$20,915	\$19,129	98.9	-\$1,806	\$5	\$13	0.8	\$925	\$60	\$201	14.7	\$962	\$20,920	\$19,141	98.5
35+	14,263	\$23,871	\$21,865	98.1	-\$2,045	\$1	\$2	0.2	\$702	\$10	\$112	18.0	\$562	\$23,872	\$21,867	98.1
By Health Status																
Excellent/Good/Very Good	30,953	\$20,973	\$19,227	93.6	-\$1,899	\$92	\$118	2.1	\$1,279	\$1,168	\$1,384	20.7	\$1,045	\$20,973	\$19,227	92.4
Fair or Poor	15,530	\$18,293	\$16,884	91.0	-\$1,610	\$194	\$228	2.9	\$1,171	\$1,269	\$1,509	23.4	\$1,028	\$18,293	\$16,884	88.7

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62. For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range). Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

Appendix Table 10. Winners and Losers in 2022 After Implementation of 13 Percent OASDI Benefit Reduction Combined with a 13 Percent Increase in SSI Federal Benefit R

	N	Social Security				Supplemental Security Income								Combined		
		Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing	Average Loss (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Gaining	Average Gain (2002\$)	Current Law Average (2002\$)	Option Average (2002\$)	Percent Losing
All	46,483	\$20,031	\$18,362	92.8	-\$1,798	\$141	\$169	3.5	\$801	\$1,204	\$1,391	29.8	\$629	\$20,172	\$18,531	91.4
All Men	20,714	\$21,136	\$19,403	93.2	-\$1,858	\$110	\$134	2.8	\$841	\$1,031	\$1,308	32.3	\$859	\$21,246	\$19,538	92.0
Never Married Men	790	\$11,816	\$10,729	92.9	-\$1,171	\$363	\$458	13.2	\$724	\$1,404	\$1,731	45.8	\$714	\$12,179	\$11,187	84.8
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	6,251	\$12,041	\$10,795	74.3	-\$1,677	\$375	\$413	4.9	\$764	\$1,593	\$1,806	23.2	\$922	\$12,416	\$11,208	73.6
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	9,873	\$26,639	\$24,563	98.0	-\$2,120	\$29	\$40	1.2	\$980	\$706	\$1,023	38.1	\$833	\$26,667	\$24,603	97.3
Widowed Men	1,218	\$15,170	\$13,857	94.4	-\$1,390	\$88	\$111	2.8	\$836	\$835	\$1,060	29.9	\$754	\$15,257	\$13,968	93.3
Divorced Men	2,582	\$14,286	\$13,032	94.7	-\$1,325	\$74	\$109	3.8	\$919	\$426	\$724	28.9	\$1,031	\$14,359	\$13,141	92.6
All Women	25,769	\$19,134	\$17,518	92.4	-\$1,750	\$166	\$197	4.0	\$779	\$1,315	\$1,565	32.8	\$763	\$12,273	\$11,336	78.4
Never Married Women	1,944	\$11,688	\$10,674	83.3	-\$1,217	\$586	\$663	13.8	\$557	\$2,064	\$2,329	44.9	\$592	\$12,273	\$11,336	78.4
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	3,151	\$5,953	\$5,336	47.7	-\$1,295	\$834	\$900	8.3	\$799	\$2,057	\$2,260	22.2	\$912	\$6,788	\$6,236	47.1
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	10,277	\$26,312	\$24,130	97.8	-\$2,231	\$38	\$54	1.3	\$1,202	\$742	\$1,051	34.2	\$904	\$26,349	\$24,184	96.9
Widowed Women	6,045	\$13,735	\$12,513	91.5	-\$1,336	\$217	\$255	5.3	\$718	\$1,514	\$1,780	34.7	\$766	\$13,952	\$12,768	90.7
Divorced Women	4,352	\$12,600	\$11,535	93.7	-\$1,136	\$129	\$169	5.2	\$763	\$776	\$1,004	29.3	\$777	\$12,730	\$11,704	90.7
Age By Sex in 2022																
Men																
65-69	9,422	\$19,526	\$17,231	90.7	-\$2,530	\$97	\$129	2.8	\$1,163	\$1,003	\$1,358	30.1	\$1,179	\$19,623	\$17,360	89.5
70-74	7,232	\$22,724	\$21,107	95.1	-\$1,700	\$124	\$145	2.9	\$698	\$977	\$1,204	31.8	\$712	\$22,849	\$21,251	94.0
75-79	4,060	\$22,039	\$21,414	95.9	-\$651	\$117	\$127	2.8	\$364	\$1,228	\$1,367	40.0	\$346	\$22,155	\$21,541	94.2
Women																
65-69	10,691	\$19,090	\$16,809	90.4	-\$2,522	\$136	\$175	3.4	\$1,155	\$1,051	\$1,359	27.0	\$1,144	\$19,226	\$16,984	89.2
70-74	9,257	\$19,741	\$18,290	94.1	-\$1,542	\$169	\$201	4.4	\$714	\$1,295	\$1,557	35.6	\$734	\$19,910	\$18,491	92.1
75-79	5,821	\$18,201	\$17,625	93.5	-\$616	\$219	\$235	4.7	\$337	\$1,793	\$1,927	38.6	\$346	\$18,421	\$17,861	92.1
By Joint OASDI-SSI Status																
Neither OASDI or SSI	8,494	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$23	0.3	\$7,412	\$0	\$69	0.8	\$8,179	\$0	\$23	.
OASDI only	35,218	\$21,409	\$19,625	98.4	-\$1,815	\$0	\$7	0.7	\$935	\$0	\$110	12.1	\$905	\$21,409	\$19,631	98.1
Both OASDI and SSI	873	\$6,178	\$5,758	82.4	-\$511	\$2,619	\$3,590	100.0	\$971	\$2,158	\$3,063	100.0	\$905	\$8,797	\$9,347	0.5
SSI only	1,898	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,841	100.0	\$514	\$7,366	\$7,903	100.0	\$537	\$7,327	\$7,841	.
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																
Bottom	9,481	\$3,769	\$3,500	30.3	-\$891	\$1,987	\$2,174	30.2	\$620	\$2,637	\$2,911	40.8	\$670	\$5,756	\$5,674	26.3
Second	8,839	\$11,605	\$10,606	86.7	-\$1,153	\$241	\$347	10.9	\$974	\$673	\$988	34.5	\$911	\$11,846	\$10,953	79.8
Third	9,397	\$17,084	\$15,603	97.9	-\$1,513	\$5	\$12	1.0	\$731	\$77	\$157	12.0	\$663	\$17,089	\$15,615	97.5
Fourth	9,604	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2	-\$1,934	\$0	\$0	0.0	\$668	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2
Top	9,162	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0	-\$2,298	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0
By Years Worked																
Zero Workyrs	8,821	\$2,818	\$2,669	14.6	-\$1,023	\$1,691	\$1,829	25.4	\$542	\$2,301	\$2,498	34.8	\$566	\$4,510	\$4,498	12.3
1-19	9,672	\$14,770	\$13,622	82.2	-\$1,397	\$453	\$548	11.3	\$840	\$1,575	\$1,914	41.7	\$815	\$15,223	\$14,169	77.1
20-29	7,157	\$18,622	\$17,059	98.1	-\$1,593	\$22	\$46	2.4	\$1,021	\$113	\$344	22.9	\$1,012	\$18,644	\$17,105	96.7
30-34	6,570	\$20,915	\$19,129	98.9	-\$1,806	\$5	\$12	0.7	\$955	\$60	\$181	11.1	\$1,086	\$20,920	\$19,140	98.5
35+	14,263	\$23,871	\$21,865	98.1	-\$2,045	\$1	\$2	0.2	\$832	\$10	\$95	13.2	\$643	\$23,872	\$21,867	98.1
By Health Status																
Excellent/Good/Very Good	30,953	\$20,973	\$19,232	93.6	-\$1,899	\$92	\$129	2.9	\$1,279	\$1,267	\$1,526	33.2	\$778	\$20,973	\$19,232	92.4
Fair or Poor	15,530	\$18,293	\$16,889	91.0	-\$1,607	\$194	\$251	4.7	\$1,204	\$973	\$1,468	51.5	\$962	\$18,293	\$16,889	88.9

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62. For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range). Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

Appendix Table 11. Winners and Losers in 2022 After Implementation of 13 Percent OASDI Benefit Reduction Combined with an Increase in SSI Asset Threshold

	N	Social Security				Supplemental Security Income								Combined		
		Current Law	Option	Percent	Average	Current Law	Option	Percent	Average	Current Law	Option	Percent	Average	Current Law	Option	Percent
		Average	Average	Losing	Loss	Average	Average	Gaining	Gain	Average	Average	Gaining	Gain	Average	Average	Losing
(2002\$)	(2002\$)		(2002\$)	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	All	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	(<i>< 125% poverty</i>)	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	(2002\$)	
All	46,483	\$20,031	\$18,362	92.8	-\$1,798	\$141	\$237	3.1	\$3,132	\$1,213	\$2,004	28.8	\$2,746	\$20,172	\$18,600	91.3
All Men	20,714	\$21,136	\$19,403	93.2	-\$1,858	\$110	\$194	2.5	\$3,312	\$1,031	\$1,911	30.5	\$2,884	\$21,246	\$19,597	91.9
Never Married Men	790	\$11,816	\$10,729	92.9	-\$1,171	\$363	\$444	9.9	\$819	\$1,404	\$1,758	37.1	\$955	\$12,179	\$11,173	85.6
Married Men, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	6,251	\$12,041	\$10,795	74.3	-\$1,677	\$375	\$733	4.3	\$8,412	\$1,593	\$3,417	23.3	\$7,830	\$12,416	\$11,528	73.5
Married Men, Spouse Beneficiary	9,873	\$26,639	\$24,563	98.0	-\$2,120	\$29	\$54	1.2	\$2,050	\$706	\$1,570	39.1	\$2,210	\$26,667	\$24,616	97.2
Widowed Men	1,218	\$15,170	\$13,857	94.4	-\$1,390	\$88	\$138	2.5	\$2,024	\$835	\$1,394	18.4	\$3,035	\$15,257	\$13,995	93.2
Divorced Men	2,582	\$14,286	\$13,032	94.7	-\$1,325	\$74	\$107	3.5	\$978	\$426	\$764	31.1	\$1,085	\$14,359	\$13,139	92.5
All Women	25,769	\$19,134	\$17,518	92.4	-\$1,750	\$166	\$272	3.5	\$3,027	\$1,315	\$2,057	27.9	\$2,661	\$12,273	\$11,327	77.9
Never Married Women	1,944	\$11,688	\$10,674	83.3	-\$1,217	\$586	\$653	6.2	\$1,085	\$2,064	\$2,366	26.0	\$1,163	\$12,273	\$11,327	77.9
Married Women, Spouse Non-Beneficiary	3,151	\$5,953	\$5,336	47.7	-\$1,295	\$834	\$1,924	11.9	\$9,155	\$2,057	\$5,126	34.5	\$8,889	\$6,788	\$7,260	46.9
Married Women, Spouse Beneficiary	10,277	\$26,312	\$24,130	97.8	-\$2,231	\$38	\$74	1.7	\$2,113	\$742	\$1,577	40.0	\$2,121	\$26,349	\$24,204	96.8
Widowed Women	6,045	\$13,735	\$12,513	91.5	-\$1,336	\$217	\$313	4.0	\$2,375	\$1,514	\$2,059	25.5	\$2,139	\$13,952	\$12,826	90.4
Divorced Women	4,352	\$12,600	\$11,535	93.7	-\$1,136	\$129	\$201	4.6	\$1,548	\$776	\$1,076	24.9	\$1,202	\$12,730	\$11,736	90.8
Age By Sex in 2022																
Men																
65-69	9,422	\$19,526	\$17,231	90.7	-\$2,530	\$97	\$159	2.3	\$2,748	\$1,003	\$1,853	28.5	\$2,989	\$19,623	\$17,390	89.5
70-74	7,232	\$22,724	\$21,107	95.1	-\$1,700	\$124	\$217	2.6	\$3,657	\$977	\$1,819	28.5	\$2,950	\$22,849	\$21,324	94.0
75-79	4,060	\$22,039	\$21,414	95.9	-\$651	\$117	\$235	3.1	\$3,762	\$1,228	\$2,279	41.0	\$2,564	\$22,155	\$21,649	93.9
Women																
65-69	10,691	\$19,090	\$16,809	90.4	-\$2,522	\$136	\$224	3.0	\$2,922	\$1,051	\$1,827	25.0	\$3,112	\$19,226	\$17,033	89.2
70-74	9,257	\$19,741	\$18,290	94.1	-\$1,542	\$169	\$285	4.1	\$2,848	\$1,295	\$2,083	33.3	\$2,366	\$19,910	\$18,575	91.9
75-79	5,821	\$18,201	\$17,625	93.5	-\$616	\$219	\$348	3.6	\$3,541	\$1,793	\$2,412	25.4	\$2,437	\$18,421	\$17,973	91.8
By Joint OASDI-SSI Status																
Neither OASDI or SSI	8,494	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$1,633	18.3	\$8,910	\$0	\$2,737	32.0	\$8,551	\$0	\$1,633	.
OASDI only	35,218	\$21,409	\$19,625	98.4	-\$1,815	\$0	\$27	1.3	\$2,080	\$0	\$406	20.8	\$1,957	\$21,409	\$19,651	97.9
Both OASDI and SSI	873	\$6,178	\$5,758	82.4	-\$511	\$2,619	\$3,030	82.4	\$510	\$2,158	\$2,538	86.3	\$448	\$8,797	\$8,787	4.5
SSI only	1,898	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$7,327	\$7,336	0.3	\$4,785	\$7,366	\$7,388	0.4	\$4,965	\$7,327	\$7,336	0.1
By Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile																
Bottom	9,481	\$3,769	\$3,500	30.3	-\$891	\$1,987	\$3,239	19.7	\$6,359	\$2,637	\$4,119	26.7	\$5,572	\$5,756	\$6,739	25.4
Second	8,839	\$11,605	\$10,606	86.7	-\$1,153	\$241	\$435	11.8	\$1,657	\$673	\$1,270	37.3	\$1,597	\$11,846	\$11,041	79.3
Third	9,397	\$17,084	\$15,603	97.9	-\$1,513	\$5	\$13	0.9	\$809	\$77	\$124	9.0	\$516	\$17,089	\$15,615	97.5
Fourth	9,604	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2	-\$1,934	\$0	\$0	0.0	\$96	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$22,930	\$21,031	98.2
Top	9,162	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0	-\$2,298	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$0	\$0	.	.	\$27,651	\$25,398	98.0
By Years Worked																
Zero Workyrs	8,821	\$2,818	\$2,669	14.6	-\$1,023	\$1,691	\$3,132	19.0	\$7,593	\$2,301	\$3,979	25.0	\$6,732	\$4,510	\$5,801	11.7
1-19	9,672	\$14,770	\$13,622	82.2	-\$1,397	\$453	\$703	9.6	\$2,605	\$1,575	\$2,447	35.9	\$2,435	\$15,223	\$14,325	76.7
20-29	7,157	\$18,622	\$17,059	98.1	-\$1,593	\$22	\$46	2.7	\$895	\$113	\$351	25.5	\$935	\$18,644	\$17,105	96.6
30-34	6,570	\$20,915	\$19,129	98.9	-\$1,806	\$5	\$12	0.8	\$888	\$60	\$174	16.6	\$686	\$20,920	\$19,141	98.5
35+	14,263	\$23,871	\$21,865	98.1	-\$2,045	\$1	\$2	0.2	\$644	\$10	\$58	10.9	\$439	\$23,872	\$21,867	98.1
By Health Status																
Excellent/Good/Very Good	30,953	\$20,973	\$19,283	93.6	-\$1,899	\$92	\$186	3.2	\$2,950	\$1,168	\$2,022	28.9	\$2,955	\$20,973	\$19,283	92.4
Fair or Poor	15,530	\$18,293	\$16,996	91.0	-\$1,608	\$194	\$276	3.6	\$2,279	\$1,269	\$1,982	28.7	\$2,486	\$18,293	\$16,996	88.7

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table universe includes all persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. Lifetime earnings quintiles are defined over ages 25 to 62. For married persons, benefit levels reflect combined husband and wife benefit totals (even when spouses fall outside of the age range). Average losses/gains are tabulated among those who lose/gain, rather than for the entire population.

Appendix Table 12: Sensitivity Analysis of Probit Estimates of SSI Participation Among SSI Eligible Individuals Aged 65 and Over, Combined 1991 and 1997 Samples

Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Marginal Effects
fssidol97	0.0017*** [0.0003]	0.0007*** [0.0001]
stsupamt	0.0017*** [0.0004]	0.0007*** [0.0002]
tage	0.0058 [0.0061]	0.0023 [0.0024]
female	-0.1687* [0.0891]	-0.0658* [0.0344]
hispanic	0.1942* [0.1158]	0.0753* [0.0441]
black	-0.0092 [0.0838]	-0.0036 [0.0330]
amind	0.5172 [0.3880]	0.1871 [0.1231]
asian	0.0917 [0.1742]	0.0358 [0.0674]
widow	0.7363*** [0.1063]	0.2821*** [0.0389]
divsep	0.9789*** [0.1235]	0.3376*** [0.0345]
nevermar	0.7463*** [0.1382]	0.2632*** [0.0410]
unitpension	-0.3828** [0.1752]	-0.1518** [0.0685]
unitss	0.4241*** [0.1301]	0.1674*** [0.0510]
lesshs	0.3232*** [0.0997]	0.1279*** [0.0394]
morehs	0.0836 [0.1557]	0.0327 [0.0604]
fb	-0.0486 [0.1365]	-0.0191 [0.0538]
ysm	0.0634 [0.0441]	0.0249 [0.0174]
ysm2	-0.0036 [0.0029]	-0.0014 [0.0012]
ysm3	0.00005 [0.0001]	0.00002 [0.00002]
ownhome	-0.2116*** [0.0788]	-0.0834*** [0.0311]
fairpoorhlth	0.3284*** [0.0729]	0.1289*** [0.0285]
share30	0.0312 [0.0801]	0.0123 [0.0315]
south	0.3820*** [0.0888]	0.1493*** [0.0343]
year	-0.0001 [0.0131]	-0.00003 [0.0052]
Constant	-2.1244 [1.3481]	----- -----
Observations	1390	
Log L	-852.05	
Pseudo R2	0.11	

Notes: Standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Source: Authors' calculations from the 1991 and 1997 SSI Financial Eligibility Model (1990 and 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation, matched to SSA administrative data).

Appendix Table 13. Sensitivity Analysis of Social Security and SSI Total Costs and Program Overlap for Persons Ages 65 to 78 in 2022 Under Current Law and the Alternatives

	Current Law (Promised)	OASDI Benefit Cut of 13%	Column 1 with GR-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with Cut-Financed Minimum	Column 1 with SSI GI Exclusion Increase	Column 1 with 13% SSI Increase	Column 1 with SSI Asset Threshold Increase
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Cost for Entire Population, Ages 65-78 in 2022</i>							
Total OASDI Costs (2002\$ in millions)	\$632,094	\$585,890	\$599,880	\$585,531	\$585,890	\$585,890	\$585,890
Total SSI Costs (2002\$ in millions)	\$6,295	\$6,660	\$6,193	\$6,238	\$7,352	\$7,358	\$9,908
Combined OASDI/SSI (2002\$ in millions)	\$638,390	\$592,551	\$606,073	\$591,769	\$593,243	\$593,248	\$595,798
Combined OASDI and SSI as % Current Law	100.0%	92.8%	94.9%	92.7%	92.9%	92.9%	93.3%
Increase in SSI as % Current Law SSI		5.8%	-1.6%	-0.9%	16.8%	16.9%	57.4%
Decrease in Soc Sec as % Current Law OASDI		-7.3%	-5.1%	-7.4%	-7.3%	-7.3%	-7.3%
<i>Joint OASDI-SSI Status</i>							
Neither	4.48	4.50	4.46	4.49	4.48	4.49	3.69
Social Security, no SSI	92.57	92.09	92.68	92.61	91.73	91.81	91.30
Both Social Security and SSI	1.48	1.95	1.39	1.43	2.30	2.23	2.73
SSI, no Social Security	1.47	1.47	1.47	1.47	1.49	1.48	2.27

Source: The Urban Institute projections from MINT3.

Notes: Table entries for joint OASDI-SSI status reflect percent of population in each group. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.

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