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Report: War and Occupation in Iraq
Chapter 4:
Killing Civilians, Murder and Atrocities
Global Policy Forum and partners
January 2007
We go out and kill these people… I define
success as continuing to kill the enemy …
- US Marine Captain Andrew del Gaudio [1]
In the counter-insurgency campaign, US Coalition
commanders have established very permissive “rules of engagement” to
insure a swift and unhesitating use of force and to minimize Coalition
casualties. At checkpoints and roadblocks, during house-searches and other
operations, these rules allow troops to open fire with little hesitation
or restraint. Commanders have seen the killing of Iraqi non-combatants in
the course of military operations as regrettable but unavoidable
“collateral damage.” This environment of extreme violence has produced
an increasing number of killings, murders and even atrocities, committed
by occupation forces against Iraqi civilians.
Rules of engagement
Rules of engagement (ROE), drawn up by senior
commanders, define when, where and how military personnel can “use
force.” ROEs may vary from one operation or mission to another. [2]
Though set by field commanders, they often require approval at a higher
level, including civilian leaders. While ROEs determine when it is
generally permissible to shoot – sometimes even at civilians - the final
decision to fire is left to the immediate judgment of troops on the
ground, influenced by uncertainty, stress, fear, hatred and sometimes
inexperience.
In light of the large number of civilian casualties,
[3] rules of engagement in
Iraq
have been subject to much criticism. Organizations such as Human Rights
Watch [4] , the American Civil Liberties Union [5] and Amnesty
International [6] , have requested that the rules be made public, but ROEs
are generally classified or for “limited” distribution only. In a news
conference in May 2005, when asked to comment on an incident involving the
shooting by a US Marine of a wounded Iraqi insurgent in Falluja, Pentagon
spokesman Lawrence DiRita answered: “We don't discuss rules of
engagement… But [soldiers] have the right of self-defense at all times,
and that's a consistent rule of engagement.” [7]
While acknowledging the hostile environment in which
Coalition forces may operate, Human Rights Watch noted that it “does not
absolve the military from its obligations to use force in a restrained,
proportionate and discriminate manner, and only when strictly
necessary.” [8] Evidence suggests that US forces operate under
permissive rules and that, in practice, there is further permissiveness in
the application of the rules by local commanders and the troops
themselves. “Kill counts” and other devices by local commanders
encourage competition among soldiers to rack up “enemy kills” and have
apparently led to very loose standards of restraint.[9] The result has
been a rapid “escalation of force” by troops under diverse
circumstances, leading to large numbers of civilian casualties.
Roadblocks & Checkpoints
From the very beginning of the occupation, there have
been excessive and unnecessary deaths at military checkpoints. [10]
Civilian casualties occur even at stable and well-defined checkpoints. But
most risky are those checkpoints that are set up in ways that make them
hard for motorists to see in advance – set up temporarily and suddenly,
or in unexpected places, or at night, or in bad weather, or on curvy roads
with poor visibility. A combination of these factors can be especially
lethal. Approaching civilians do not see the checkpoint and learn of it
only when they face a hail of bullets or heavy weapon fire. The troops,
for their part, see approaching vehicles as a potential threat and tend to
open fire upon suspicion, however unfounded.
The soldiers often say they direct their fire at
disabling the vehicle, but the record shows that they often fire directly
at the driver and passengers, taken (often incorrectly) to be hostile
persons. One example is the case of Walid Fayay Mazban, who was driving
with his family in
Basra
in August 2003. It was about 8:30pm and very dark because there was no
electricity. The vehicle turned at a junction near a British temporary
checkpoint. The soldiers, fearing “suspicious” behavior, shouted
"stop" in English. After the vehicle failed to stop and passed
through, they shot at it several times from behind. Walid Fayay Mazban did
not understand English. He may not even have heard the order. He died from
multiple bullet injuries. [11]
The case of Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena brought
checkpoint violence into broad public view. On March 4, 2005, after
Italian intelligence had negotiated her release from abduction, Sgrena was
riding in a car to the
Baghdad
airport with high-ranking Italian intelligence officer Nicola Calpari. As
the car approached the airport, the Italian driver alerted US military
authorities by phone. But suddenly, as the car rounded a turn, US soldiers
at a temporary roadblock opened fire with 50mm machine guns mounted atop
Humvee vehicles. The bullets wounded Sgrena and killed Calpari. [12] The
incident caused great outcry in
Italy
, where the government demanded an inquiry. It turned out that the
“mobile checkpoint” had been set up because
US
Ambassador John Negroponte was having dinner with
US
General George Casey, commander of US forces, somewhere in the
neighborhood. [13]
US
authorities apologized, but blamed the Italians for driving fast, not
stopping, and not providing enough information about their whereabouts.
[14] The Italians said they were going no more than 25 miles per hour, did
not see the checkpoint until it was too late, and had kept authorities
fully posted. [15] Even though none of the official procedures for
warnings on the road had been followed, US commanders exonerated the
soldiers involved. The incident was widely covered in the press and heavy
criticism continued for weeks. Other journalists and media workers have
been injured or killed in checkpoint incidents.
Human Rights Watch issued a statement highly critical
of checkpoint shootings, saying that many Iraqi civilians and others had
died unnecessarily because Coalition forces had failed to take basic
precautions. [16] Human rights organizations have urged commanders to
reduce these killings by putting out warnings at a distance from the
checkpoint – prominent signs in Arabic, physical barriers to force
vehicles to slow down such as speed bumps and rubber cones, bright lights
and lines in the road. [17] Warning shots, the human rights experts have
pointed out, are ineffective and dangerous, because they are sometimes
mistaken as hostile fire, causing drivers to accelerate.
US
commanders adopted many of the suggestions for improved procedures, but
the procedures have rarely been implemented on the ground. [18] Checkpoint
killings have continued, and many cases have been reported in the press.
[19]
House-searches
US Coalition forces routinely carry out house-searches,
in pursuit of insurgent fighters and weapons caches. They often use
disproportionately violent methods to break into houses, such as shooting
door locks, placing a bomb or hand grenade outside the door and battering
down front walls with army vehicles. [20] During the first two months of
Operation Together Forward, US and Iraqi forces damaged “more than 1,100
doors, 35 windows and 1,350 locks” in
Baghdad
. [21] The searches that follow entry into the house are very tense and
orders may be shouted in English which family members do not understand.
Sometimes, troops may simply consider a house to be a “free-fire zone”
and commanders may give orders to “shoot first and ask questions
later.” [22] Civilian casualties also result when eager troops toss hand
grenades into houses or rooms where they believe insurgents to be. [23]
Patrols
During patrols, Coalition forces regularly fire on
innocent Iraqis, fearful that they might be insurgents. According to a BBC
interview with an Iraqi witness, US patrols have shot and killed many
civilians “by accident.” [24] Citing several examples from
Anbar
Province
, the man claims that “nearly 100 people have died in this way over the
past year.” [25] According to estimates by the Iraqi Police in
Baghdad
,
US
forces killed 33 unarmed civilians and injured 45 in the capital alone,
between May 1 and July 12, 2005. [26]
Under constant fear of being ambushed, troops tend to
shoot first. Military convoys constantly patrol the streets. Each convoy
has a soldier ready to activate his gun from the roof of the humvee, in
case a car comes closer than 100 yards. In June 2005, Salah Jmor arrived
in
Baghdad
with his brother to visit his family. As he was driving, he did not see a
US
military convoy entering the highway. Suddenly, he collapsed after being
shot by a single bullet in the head. His brother claims that there was no
signal to slow down and that they did not hear any warning shot. [27] This
type of incidents is not rare in
Iraq
. Iraqis complain that they often do not understand signs or do not see
them until it is too late and the shooting has already begun.
During routine foot patrols at night, troops are even
more nervous about potential car or road bombs. After curfew, they stop
all vehicles by shouting words in English and firing a warning shot. But
often, the drivers do not see them in the dark, and do not understand the
calls, if they can hear them at all. If cars fail to stop, troops fire
waves of bullets, often wounding the driver and passengers. In January
2005, a case gruesomely documented by photojournalist Chris Hondros, US
troops during a routine foot patrol fired on an approaching vehicle
carrying an Iraqi family. A
US
soldier shouted "Stop that car!" Simultaneously another soldier
fired warning shots. But the car did not stop immediately. A few seconds
later, waves of bullets hit the car until it stopped. Six children emerged
from the vehicle. The two parents were dead. [28]
Walking is not safer than driving at night. In one case
documented by Amnesty International, two men left their home in al-Majdiyeh,
and went in the street to find out what was happening after hearing
gunfire at night. A few minutes later, they were both dead, mistakenly
shot by a British patrol. One of the men was hit by seven bullets in his
chest and stomach. The other took five bullets in the right arm, the right
leg, the chest and lower body. “I am sorry. There was a mistake. I
apologize,” said a soldier to the father of one of the men. “It was
dark. One colleague was in a hurry. I am sorry...” [29]
Air Strikes
The
US
is increasingly resorting to air strikes against insurgents in
Iraq
, to minimize US casualties and lower the risks involved in ground
operations. According to military figures, the number of air strikes rose
from 25 in January to 120in November 2005. [30] While the US Air Force
claims to operate with sophisticated, precision guided munitions to avoid
civilian casualties, many innocents have died during air operations in
residential neighborhoods.
In November 2005, the Coalition carried out an air
offensive in
Anbar
Province
. The
US
did not assess civilian causalities, but the Washington Post reported that
according to eyewitnesses and doctors, many civilians were killed,
including children. [31] The same month, Coalition air forces conducted an
air strike against “two al-Qaida terrorist safe houses” in al-Qaim.
While the military claimed to be acting on multiple intelligence sources,
the UN Integrated Regional Information Network reported that
“dozens of civilians including women and children” were killed. [32]
In January 2006, US warplanes targeted a farmhouse in Baiji, killing in
their sleep nine innocents in a family, including women and children. [33]
Despite the large number of civilians killed during air operations, the
US
military does not count civilian deaths from US attacks, claiming that
“investigating deaths caused by any one strike is often impractical in
dangerous areas.” [34]
Criminal Homicide & Murder
US
troops have occasionally committed premeditated murder against Iraqi
civilians, in unprovoked situations. Many such murders doubtless escape
notice, because they are attributed to “threatening behavior” that the
perpetrator alleges came from the victim. Still, a number of cases have
now come to light.
Haditha is the most infamous and well
publicized case. On November 19, 2005, a squad of US marines went on a
rampage after a roadside bomb killed one of their groups. The squad's
leader initially killed five unarmed young men who happened onto the scene
in a taxi. [35] The marines then raided nearby houses, firing freely and
killing civilians, including women and children. [36] Twenty-four Iraqis
died in the incident, including ten women and children and an elderly man
in a wheelchair. [37] The marines involved have claimed that they were
under a concerted attack by insurgents and their lawyers have argued that
their action was a “justifiable use of lethal force.” [38] But
credible evidence suggests that the civilians were all unarmed and that
the marines shot the Iraqis in cold blood and then tried to eliminate
damaging evidence, including a headquarters log and video from an aerial
drone that showed the incident. [39] Like
Abu Ghraib
,
US
officials first described the Haditha massacre as an isolated case of
misconduct. But the incident led to other revelations about atrocities,
showing that it was part of a pattern of extreme and unrestrained violence
that was more common among US Coalition troops than had been previously
realized.
Mahmoudiya, another massacre, took place
on March 12, 2006. Four army soldiers stationed at a checkpoint south of
Baghdad
had a drinking bout, changed into dark civilian clothes and walked to a
close-by Iraqi home inhabited by the al-Janabi family. Leaving one soldier
outside to guard the door, the others entered and killed the two parents
and a five year old daughter. Two of the soldiers then raped a 14-year-old
Iraqi girl, Abeer Qassim al-Janabi, and then murdered her. The girl’s
body was found naked and partly burned, evidently in order to destroy the
evidence. [40] According to a FBI affidavit filed in the case, the men
made advances towards the young woman for a week before the attack. [41]
One of the cases, involving Specialist James Barker, has already come to
trial and the defendant has pleaded guilty and been sentenced to 90 years
in prison. Barker told the court: “To live there, to survive there, I
became angry and mean. I loved my friends, my fellow soldiers and my
leaders, but I began to hate everyone else in
Iraq
.” [42]
Ishhaqi, another incident, took place on
March 15, 2006.
US
marines attacked a farmhouse, eight miles north of the city of
Balad
, evidently because of intelligence that an insurgent was inside.
Helicopter gunships fired on the house in support of the attackers. Some
accounts say that fire was returned from the house, which US forces
eventually captured. According to a report by the Iraqi police’s
Joint
Coordination
Center
, based on a report filed after a local police investigation, US forces
entered the house, “gathered the family members in one room and executed
11 persons, including five children, four women and two men. Then they
bombed the house, burned three vehicles and killed their animals.” [43]
Among those who died were a 75 year old woman and a six month old child.
Hamdaniya is similarly disturbing. On
April 26, 2006, a squad of seven
US
marines and one navy sailor apparently dragged an innocent, unarmed and
disabled Iraqi, Hashim Ibrahim Awad, from his home, bound his hands and
feet, and repeatedly shot him at point blank range. [44] The squad had
been lying in ambush for someone else and when that person did not appear
they devised a plan to kill any Iraqi instead. [45] The men entered
Awad’s home, dragged him out, shot him repeatedly in the head and chest,
and then staged the scene to make it look like Awad had been an insurgent.
The men were charged on June 21, 2006 with premeditated murder,
kidnapping, conspiracy and making false statements to investigators. One
participant, Petty Officer Nelson Bacos, who testified against the others
in an early trial, said: “I didn’t believe they would carry out a plan
like that … there was no justification … I knew what we were doing was
wrong.” [46]
Military commanders and courts have systematically
referred to Haditha and other massacres as isolated cases. But the large
number of such incidents suggests that the atrocities are systemic and
have arisen from permissive rules of engagement and a broader culture of
excessive violence, often condoned by commanders.
Cover-Ups
In most cases of serious misconduct and murder,
soldiers directly involved have tried to cover up the crimes and often
commanders have ignored evidence, failed to actively pursue even the most
serious cases and made exculpatory public statements. In the case of Haditha,
the Marine Corps issued a press release the next day claiming that many of
the Iraqis killed had died from the blast of an insurgent bomb, a version
contested by witnesses. In spite of the many Iraqi casualties, the company
commander did not inspect the site, choosing to rely on the report of the
soldiers involved. Subsequently, investigators found that pages were
missing from a company logbook that recorded major incidents and a video
tape from a drone flying overhead disappeared, suggesting that the
perpetrators or those in collusion with them had destroyed or withheld
evidence. [47] Those involved in the incident apparently also made
misleading statements to investigators and the drone video resurfaced but
was not turned over to investigators until after the first major report
had been made by a senior general. [48] A marine inquiry later determined
that “some officers gave false information to their superiors” in the
initial follow-up to the case. [49] Though the truth was eventually
uncovered by the military justice system, the details of the case show how
officers, including senior officers, may go to great lengths to block
accountability, even where serious crimes have occurred.
As in Mahmudiya where soldiers tried to
conceal evidence of the rape and killing of the teenage girl and her
family, [50] or in Hamdaniya where the soldiers put an AK-47
automatic rifle next to the man they had murdered to suggest that he was
an insurgent, [51] those involved in the Ishaqi murders
called in air support to blow up the house. It appears that they hoped
that the crime would disappear beneath the rubble. [52] The
US
command first exonerated the soldiers, saying that three civilians died
due to the exchange of fire in a military operation and also due to the
collapse of the house which occurred during the combat. The civilian
deaths were determined to be “unintentional,” and
US
forces involved in the incident were said to have “followed the rules of
engagement.” [53] But following complaints by neighbors and local
leaders who claimed the soldiers entered the house while it was still
standing, the Iraqi police unexpectedly opened an inquiry using a
US-trained criminal investigation team that literally dug up the facts
from the collapsed house. [54] After examining the bodies, hands bound,
all in one room with execution-style bullet holes to the head and spent US
cartridges nearby, the investigation concluded that the people had been
murdered in cold blood. Eleven, not three, bodies were found in the
rubble. [55] Autopsies at
Tikrit
Hospital
confirmed that all the victims had bullet wounds to the head. [56] The BBC
has shown a video from an Associated Press cameraman, taken afterwards on
the scene, that the BBC concludes provides strong evidence of the
atrocity. [57] But the
US
military has refused to open a case or to investigate further.
In the case of the death of Italian intelligence agent
Nicola Calipari too, an Italian government report issued on May 3, 2005
criticized the way that evidence of the shooting disappeared. The scene of
the incident was not preserved for investigation and the logs of the
military unit on the day in question were later destroyed. At the very
least, this seemed to be sloppy procedure and at worst the obstruction of
justice and the covering up of a crime. [58]
US military authorities, embarrassed by a rash of
atrocities, have chosen to back up the official version of the facts,
insisting that victims died as collateral damage in military operations.
Such cover-ups have kept some cases from public view entirely, and they
have diminished the strength of the evidence against the perpetrators of
the prosecuted crimes. They have contributed to the dismissals of cases
and the very weak sentences that are usually handed down.
Impunity
The military justice system has acted only very rarely
to punish cases of murder and atrocities. Most such cases have never
reached the point of a formal charge. Those cases in which a charge has
been handed down have usually been dismissed at the preliminary
administrative tribunal stage or at the later court martial phase. Or they
have been settled at either stage with a very mild rebuke or punishment.
Very few charges have included premeditated murder, even in such egregious
cases as Haditha.
In late August, 2006, the Washington Post conducted
a substantial review of military cases during the period June 2003 to
February 2006. The Post report found that out of thousands of Iraqis
killed by US soldiers under questionable circumstances, the military
justice system prosecuted only a “small portion of the incidents.”
[59] No homicide prosecutions at all have arisen from shootings at
checkpoints and very few high-ranking officials have been charged.
Commanders – in whose hands lies the initial decision
to start a criminal investigation against their subordinates - have often
failed to investigate Iraqi civilian deaths. Instead they have preferred
to consider them as unintended consequence of combat operations and
ordered administrative or non-judicial punishments instead. “I think
there are a number of cases that never make it to the reporting stage, and
in some that do make it to the reporting stage, there has been a
reluctance to pursue them vigorously,” said Gary Solis, a former Marine
prosecutor. “There have been fewer prosecutions in
Iraq
than one might expect.” [60] An army major quoted by the Washington Post
concurred: “I think there were many other engagements that should have
been investigated, definitely. But no one wanted to look at them or report
them high… It was just the way thing worked.” [61]
Criticism
The killing of civilians by US troops has raised anger
and outrage among the Iraqi population and has sparked strong statements
from Iraqi officials. Asked to comment on the events in Haditha, Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki called them “totally unacceptable” and
qualified
US
violence against civilians as a "daily phenomenon" in
Iraq
. He said bluntly that US Coalition troops do not “respect the Iraqi
people.” [62] After the announcement that a
US
investigation had cleared troops in the Ishaqi case, the Iraqi government
reacted strongly. Adnan al-Kazimi, an aide to Prime Minister al-Maliki,
said the government would demand an apology from the
US
and compensation for the victims in several cases. [63]
The small number of convictions has pushed the Iraqi
government to question the immunity given to members of Coalition forces
since June 2004. Al-Maliki publicly said he believed immunity from Iraqi
courts “encouraged [troops] to commit crimes in cold blood.” [64] Iraq
Human Rights Minister Wigdan Michael concurred, that the
US
failure to hold soldiers accountable for their crimes had fostered a
climate of impunity among troops: “One of the reasons for this is the UN
resolution, which gives the multinational force soldiers immunity. Without
punishment, you get violations. This happens when there is no
punishment.” [65] Michael also raised the possibility that
Iraq
would demand a review of the Multinational Forces’ immunity by the UN
Security Council. [66]
Conclusion
The
United States
and its allies claim they do everything in their power to prevent civilian
casualties. Yet, there are many accounts of Coalition forces opening fire
and killing Iraqi civilians in circumstances where there was no imminent
threat of death or injury to the Coalition troops or anyone else. This is
in clear breach of international human rights standards relating to the
use of force. In many cases of patrols, house searches, and relentless
bombing campaigns, military personnel have used lethal force in absolutely
unjustified circumstances. Studies of civilian mortality in
Iraq
suggest that tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis have been killed in this
way since the occupation began. [67]
Murders and atrocities are the extreme form of the
daily deadly violence. In
Iraq
, where US Coalition forces see every man of military age as a potential
fighter, and where fear and anger affect the behavior of troops, events
like the Haditha massacre are all too likely to occur. This environment of
extreme violence and impunity paves the way for murder, rape and
atrocities. These acts are prohibited by The Hague Conventions and the
Geneva Conventions and they constitute serious war crimes.
Footnotes
[1] As cited in Dexter Filkins: “In Ramadi, Fetid
Quarters and Unrelenting Battles” New York Times (July 5, 2006)
[2] Chapter 5 of the Operational Law Handbook put out by the Judge
Advocate School of the Army
[3] See Chapter
5, section on “mortality”
[4] Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds (October, 2003)
[5] American Civil Liberties Union, “ACLU to Seek Public
Accountability in Haditha Investigations” (June 22, 2006)
[6] Amnesty International, Killing of Civilians in Basra and al-Amara
(May 14, 2004)
[7] US Department of Defense News Transcript, Defense Department
Regular Briefing with Lawrence Di Rita, Pentagon Spokesman; and Lieutenant
General James T. Conway, Director, Operations, Joint Staff (May 5, 2005)
[8] Human Rights Watch, op.cit.
[9] Borzou Daragahi and Julian E. Barnes, “Officers Allegedly Pushed
'Kill Counts'” Los Angeles Times (August 3, 2006)
[10] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds
(October, 2003) ; Human Rights Watch, “US Checkpoints Continue
to Kill” (May 2005) and “Joint Letter from Human Rights Watch and the
Committee to Protect Journalists to Secretary Rumsfeld” (June 17, 2005)
[11] Amnesty International, op.cit.
[12] “Hostage Recounts US Shooting” CNN (March 6, 2005)
[13] Christopher Dickey, “Reality Checkpoints” Newsweek
(March 11, 2005)
[14] Declassified US Report on the Killing of Mr. Nicola Calipari
[15] “Italy Disputes US Shooting Acount” CNN (March 8, 2005)
[16] Joint Letter from Human Rights Watch and the Committee to Protect
Journalists to Secretary Rumsfeld (June 17, 2005)
[17] Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds (October, 2003) See
also: Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Checkpoints Lack Basic Safety
Measures (June 17, 2005)
[18] Joint Letter from Human Rights Watch and the Committee to Protect
Journalists to Secretary Rumsfeld (June 17, 2005)
[19] See for instance Hillary Brown “ Pregnant Iraqi Woman Shot near
Security Checkpoint” ABC News (May 31, 2006); Trudy Rubin
“Hidden Toll: Civilians Killed Accidentally” Philadelphia Inquirer
(July 12, 2006)
[20] For example, see World Health Organization, Detailed
Situation Report in Talafar (August 19, 2005)
[21] Spc. Joshua Ramey, “Together Forward Restores Life to Ameriyah” Official
MNF-I website (September 20, 2006)
[22] Josh White, “Death in Haditha” Washington Post (January
6, 2006)
[23] Richard Whittle, “Rules of Engagement: What Were they at Haditha?”
Christian Science Monitor (October 10, 2006)
[24] “Iraqi Viewpoint: Iraqis Fear US Troops” BBC (June 1,
2006)
[25] Ibid.
[26] Richard Paddock, “Shots in the Heart of Baghdad” Los Angeles
Times (July 25, 2005)
[27] Ibid.
[28] Chris Hondros,“A Shooting after Nightfall” Newsday
(January 19, 2005)
[29] Amnesty International, op.cit.
[30] Ellen Knickmeyer and Salih Saif Aldin, “US Raid Kills Family North
of Baghdad” Washington Post (January 4, 2006)
[31] Ellen Knickmeyer “US Airstrikes Take Toll on Civilians” Washington
Post (December 24, 2005)
[32] “Civilians Killed Near al-Qaim in Air Strike, Doctors Say” UN
Integrated Regional Information Networks (November 1, 2005)
[33] Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Omar Al-Neami “US Strike on Home Kills 9
in Family, Iraqi Officials Say” New York Times (January 4,
2006)
[34] Knickmeyer and Aldin, op.cit.
[35] Josh White, “Death in Haditha” Washington Post (January
6, 2006)
[36] Ibid.
[37] Richard Engel, “What Happened in Haditha” NBC News (May
30, 2006)
[38] David S. Cloud, “Marines Have Excised Evidence on 24 Iraqi
Deaths” New York Times (August 18, 2006)
[39] Ibid.
[40] Tim Whitmire, “Ex-Soldier Charged with Rape, Murder” Associated
Press (July 3, 2006)
[41] Rick Jervis & Andrea Stone, “Four More Soldiers Accused of
Rape, Murder in Iraq” USAToday (July 9, 2007)
[42] As quoted in “Iraq Rape Soldiers given Life Sentence” Guardian
(November 17, 2006)
[43] Mathew Schofield, “Iraqi Policy Report Details Civilians’ Deaths
and Hands of US Troops” Knight Ridder Newspapers (McClatchy)
(March 19, 2006)
[44] White, Josh, Sonya Geis. "8 Troops Charged In Death Of
Iraqi" Washington Post (June 22, 2006)
[45] Carolyn Marshall, “Corpsman Who Failed to Halt Killing of Iraqi
Receives Prison Sentence” New York Times (October 7, 2006)
[46] Ibid.
Another marine, John Jodka III, after a plea bargain, was found guilty on
a reduced charge and sentenced to 18 months in jail on November 16, 2006.
See “Marine Sentenced Over
Iraq
Civilian Killing” Guardian (November 16, 2006).
[47] Cloud, op.cit.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Thomas E. Ricks, “ Probe Into Iraq Deaths Finds False Reports” Washington
Post ( June 1, 2006)
[50] “
US
Military Trial Ordered in Iraq Murder Cases” Reuters (October
19, 2006)
[51] Sonya Geis, “Hearings Begin for Marines Accused of Killing Iraqi”
Washington Post (August 31, 2006)
[52] Schofield, op.cit.
[53] Will Dunham, “Troops Cleared in Iraqi Deaths in Ishaqi”
Reuters (June 2, 2006)
[54] Schofield, op.cit.
[55] Ziad Khalaf, “Raid Kills 11, Mostly Women and Children” Associated
Press/Army Times (March 15, 2006)
[56] Schofield, op.cit.
[57] “New ‘Iraq Massacre’ Tape Emerges” BBC (June 2,
2006)
[58] Fitzroy Sterling “Still Seeking Answers in US Checkpoint Killing”
Inter Press Service (June 24, 2006)
[59] Josh White, Charles Lane and Julie Tate, "Homicide Charges Rare
In Iraq War" Washington Post (August 28, 2006)
[60] “Convictions in US Cases Rare in Iraq” United Press
International (August 28, 2006)
[61] Cited in White, Lane and Tate, op.cit.
[62] Richard A. Oppel “Iraqi Assails US for Strikes on Civilians” New
York Times (June 2, 2006)
[63] Brian Brady “Furious Iraq Demands Apology as US Troops Are Cleared
of Massacre” Scotland on Suday (June 4, 2006)
[64] Cited in Aaron Glantz, “GIs in Iraq Could Be Stripped of Immunity
After Rape–Murder Allegations” OneWorld (July 12, 2006)
[65] Mariam Karouny “Iraq to Ask UN to End US Immunity after Rape
Case” Reuters (July 2, 2006)
[66] Ibid.
[67] See Chapter
5, section on Mortality
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